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In May ot 194.5, Germany was in a state ot virtual collapse. 
Chaos reigned. Over 4 • .S million Germans had been killed and over twice 
as man7 had been driven .from their homes in eastern Europe. Damage 
to physical property was unprecedented. In Berlin, 7S per cent of the 
houses had been destroyed or severely damaged. In some cities, such aa 
Dusseldorf, less than S per cent of the homes were inhabitable. ¥.i0st of 
the waterways and harbors were blocked and most bridges destroyed. Much 
of the vital railway system was temporarily unusable. Industrial and 
agricultural production was cut in half, and food, clothing, and 
consumer necessities were in severely short supply. Germany's .financial 
system was just as terribly disrupted with a national debt that had 
increased ten times since 1939 and a currency which had in.f'lated 
l sevenfold in the same period. The social structure had collapsed. The 
urban middle classes had, in a large part, become "proletarized.n2 A 
mood ot despair prevailed. As people crowded into the ruined cities, 
privacy, food, and warmth became their only concerns. Political matters 
1 Gordon Wright, !.!!!. Ordeal 2! Total !{£: 19a9·124S, The Rise of 
Modem Europe, ed. by William L. Langer (New York: arper Torch-
books, 1968), P• 264. 
2tewis J. Edinger, � Schwuacher: ! Stud1 ,!!! Personality ,!!!!! 
Political Behavior (Stanford, Califomia: Stanford UniverSity Press, 
1965), p. 74. 
l 
were the farthest thin&• hom tb• mnda of the Geraan peopl.e.3 
In eontra•"• Genm,r• a Alteri.can occupiers bad esoaped the 
var relati"Nl.Y ansoathed. The United Stet.ea had lost onl.7 )001000 
daad, a tragi.c nm1ber b11t. sUll sull vben ooq>aed to European lo•••· 
American industrJ, tc fltoll being destro,.C 'bT ._., b:l gJIUWD t.re­
Jltlldoualy • vi th product.ion nearl1 douhl.ina 4u.rinc the var ,. . .. ll With 
ite uaive, WU..equipped armed torcu, the United States stood 
tri.aphant over :rmrop.. 
2 
Thia, then, was the situation 11b1oh exlne4 Wbc the Allies 
asaml8d the m111"1:7 occup•tion ot �. It••• also the enviromen\ 
inilo which Gel'!Mn politic.i paniea r..,811Vlad. 
!be objective ot this thesis i8 to _.:1.ne \be attitwlea aml 
policies ot the Amenoan ocoupation otticiala towud one ot tbaae r ... 
emerging pu-t.tu, the German Social Deaocrat:ic Party or SPD. American 
reaction toward earl.7 :post.var fJeZ'IWl poll ti.cal aot1vi t7 will be 
ft1"ft;ved and. United State• oppo si'Uon to the SPD•a political and 
eoonom:lc goals emphaaiaed. O.t apacial interest ia the American attitude 
toward the SPD d.ui-1ns the cl"ild.• over the Socill.ist Uni tr P•l"t7• It is 
'lfl1' intention to determine .it, during the period hona 191&5 until 1949 
when Amm-iean poli.01 toward German political parties was proclaimed '° 
be neutral, the United Stat.ea waa oppo a9d to the SPD and 1te goal.a of 
Socialism and centl'el.1••tUm.. and t.c> d1900ftl' if .&Jllerioan occupation 
personnel, Who belieYed strongly in the Amencan qatam of federal.iam 
and tree enterJ>ri••• did interfere in the� political p:roceas.t.o 
the diaadvantqe of the SPD. 
w. 
liaorc:ton Wright, Total War, P• 265. 
CH.APTER II 
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RF.-:EM.E.:RGl'llCE OF 
GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES 
In April of 1945, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff issued 
a directive which was to be the basis of the American occupation of 
Germany. This document is commonly referred to as JCS 1067. Although 
the directive dealt with the whole broad range of problems facing the 
American occupation, its political and economic aspects are or importance 
for this study. 
JCS 1067 called for American policy to work toward the 
"decentralization" of both the political and economic structure of 
Germany.S This decentralization was to faoilltate:achieving the ultimate 
objective of United States policy for Germany which was to "prevent 
6 Germany .from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world." 
The communique of the Big Three conference at Potsdam in July and August 
or 194.$ reiterated many of the points of JCS 1067, especially those on 
decentralization and the maintenance or only a DJinimal standard of 
living tor the German people.7 
Su.s. Department o! State, "Militar;:r Govemment of Germany: 
Directive to the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces o! 
Occupation," Department .2.£ State Bulletin, IDI (October 211 1945) 1 591. 
6 Ibid., P• 598. 
-
7u.s. Department of State, Occupation 2f. Germany: Polley ..!}!! 
Prof)'eae, �45-46 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 
!94 I P• 9. 
.3 
4 
It is interesting to note that point nine of JCS 1067 ordered 
the American occupation commander to "assure that • • • [.th.iJ • • • 
military government • • • ffeiJ • • • not become committed to any poll tical 
group. 118 Before the end of 1946 the United States would abandon this 
point or JCS 1067 as well as its stringent restrictions on German 
economic recovery and would be promoting the development of German 
industry on a free enterprise basis, to the detriment of the SPD. 
Less than a week after the surrender of Germany, the .American 
occupation forces were making plans towa.rd retuming some form or 
governmental control to the German people. Robert Murphy• who was the 
State Department official assigned to advise the Military Government on 
political matters, advised the Secretary of State that the United States 
should immediately begin the re-establishment of German administrative 
machinery on a regional basis, with Germans who had not been :Nazis 
occupying the positions. Murphy stated at that time his belief that the 
real purpose of American military government was to retum control to the 
German people as soon as it was f'easible.9 
This opinion was not universally shared by American officials, 
however. Some believed it was too early to allow a renewal o! political 
activity, even by anti-fascist groups such as the SPn.lO 
8nepartment .2! State Bulletin, p. 600. 
9Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, May 12, 1945, u.s. 
Department of State, Foreip Relations of the United States: Diplomatic 
Papers, � /ftereafter cited as iiVl",V'ol.III, European Adv.isor.y 
Co111111ission; Austria; Germany (Washington, D.C.t u.s. Oovemment Prl.llting 
Office, 1968), P• 940. 
10 Ambassador Caffery to the Secretary of State, June J, 1945, 
�·• p. 9hl.. Jefferson Caffery was Ambassador to France. 
By the middle of June, the local military governments in the 
United States Zone were becoming increasingly concerned with poll tj.cal 
problems. Some local poll tical grt>ups had begun to ask for permission 
5 
to recommend candidates for office. The Office of Military Government tor 
Germany, United States, or OMGUS, was unwilling at this time to recognize 
these groups as political parties as such, but it was willing to accept 
a list of n81tles or candidates. Permission was also granted for some of 
these groups to hold political meetings. Un.fortunately, the lack of 
lmowledge ot German political history was a hindrance to the military 
government in deal:ing with these groupe.u 
At this time, the United States instituted advisory councils to 
try to bridge the gap between the administrative officials,, appointed by 
OMGUS, and the local German population. This action gave a � f'acto 
recognition to political groups. The advisory councils were purel.7 
consultative and had no real authority. The German people v.1.ewed. thm 
as a part of the American administration and as a compromise, the 
Councils satisf"ied fn people.12 
The Military Government had also begun to consult with Germans 
of various factions to obtain their Views on Germany• s future. 
Consultations with the Catholic hierarchy in the American Zone revealed 
the anti-socialist feelings of the Catholics. The clergymen feared any 
11ilarold Zink to Donald Heath, June 10, 1945, �., P• 948. 
l2Leonard Krieger, 11'l'he Interregnwn in Germany: March-August 
1945," Political Science !i1arter!z, LXIV (December, 1949), 524. · 
6 
leftist activity, and they lumped the SPD, the KPD {German Communist 
Party), and other left wing groups all together. The Bishop of Regensberg 
denounced all these groups and warned the Americans that Russian 
propaganda broadcasts condemning the harshness of the Western occupation 
would lead to leftist political gains in the United States Zone.13 
Toward the end ot July, the United States sought out the views 
of some SPD officials on the occupation. However, the Americans were 
not making 81'11 specific judgeP.tents on the SPD yet because the party 
had not announced a formal program.14 
Richard Brewster, the OMGUS official who had spoken with the 
above SPD members, reported to Murphy that, other than the Communists, 
most German political groups favored the ban which was in effect on 
political activity. They seellled to believe that people were too concerned 
with obtaining food and shelter to be worried with poll tical matters at 
that time.15 Brewster also suggested that the United States should support 
a 11centertt German government. He feared that the terrible economic and 
social conditions, plus the "hesitating" American policy would drive the 
16 Germans to the left or right. 
On August 18, 1945, General Eisenhower announced that, according 
to the Potsdam agreements, German political parties which were "democratic" 
would be encouraged and allowed the rights or assembly and public 
1.lirRus, 1945, Vol. II, p. 948. 
�bert Murphy to the Secretary 0£ State, July 21, 1945, 
�., ·P• 950. 
15 
!2!!!•1 P• 951. 
16rb1d. 
discussion. Free trade unions were also to be permitted, as long as 
they were compatible vi th military security. OMGUS would grant 
permission for the above activities and was to report all those not 
authorized as well as those that were.17 
In late September, Murphy visited Munich tc review the de-
nazification programs on behalf of General Lucius D. Clay, then Deputy 
Military Governor in the u.s. Zone of occupation. He spoke with 
Military Government officials as well as with leaders of the Ge:man 
16 parties. 
While on this trip, Murphy became involved in a controversy 
which indicated the direction in which OMGUS policy toward the SPD was 
moving. During the course of his investigation of the situation in 
Bavaria, Murphy decided that Minister President Schaefer, a staunch 
conservative who opposed .American plans for early' elections and the de-
nazitication program, should be relieved and a more representative 
Bavarian Government .formed. Murphy had intended to recommend Albert 
Rosshaupter as the new Minister President. Rosshaupter was a senior 
SPD official with an excellent ant1-nazi record, including a long term 
at Dachau concentration camp. Eisenhower, however, had decided on 
Wilhelm Hoegner, also a Social Democrat, for the position because be 
would be less inclined to allow the communists to participate in any 
coalition government.19 
17aeneral Eisenhower to the War Department, August 7, 1945, 
�., p. 954. 
l8Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, October 3, 1945, 






Murphy met w1 th Hoegner and received his assurances that he would 
try to represent all the Bavarian poll tical groups. Murphy believed Hoegner 
was eager to car y out United States policy.20 .Apparently, SPD members 
o:t this type were acceptable to OMGUS. We shall see later how it felt 
about a more independent breed of SPD poll tician. 
Shortly a!'ter his retum from Munich, Murphy and Clay prepared 
a document on the German political situation which was sent to the War 
Department. It is worth examining to determine the official Ol'1GUS 
interpre"t.ation or the German political parties. 
It was reported that political parties had been formed in all the 
large cities soon after they were permitted. In Stuttgart, Frankfurt, 
and Kassel, the SPD and the KPD were most active, gathering moderate 
and orderl.J' crowd.a. In Munich the situation was a li ttJ.e different, 
because the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), the Bavarian counterpart of 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the other Laende� was also highly 
active. The parties had avoided ttdoctrinaire" discussions and had called 
tor adherence to democratic principles, cooperation 'With the Military 
Government, concentration on German reconstruction, and the de-nazii'ication 
of German life. However, only the communists favored the indiscriminate 
removal of Nazis.21 
The url>an centers were developing a pattem of two left parties. 
the SPD and the KPD. These tended to cooperate with each other but not 
merge. The SPD seemed to be gaining the largest following• except in 
2laeneral Clay to the War Department, October 13, 1945, 
�·· p. 981. 
*The Laender were the German States. 
9 
Bavaria where the CSU appeared to be replacing the old Bavarian People's 
Party as the dominant poli ti.cal group. 22 
The above memo maintains the official palicy of neutrality toward 
the German poll tical parties which OMGUS continued to voice throughout the 
occupation. The Mill tary Government was merely the "unbiased observer" 
reporting the political events as they occurred and remaining aloof as 
long as democratic principles were not violated. Unofficial policy was 
_quite another matter. 
In early October, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, the unofficial h�ad of 
the SPD, called for a national party conference to discuss the problems 
facing Germany during the occupation.23 The United States did not look 
f'avorably upon the idea of a national poll ti.cal meeting. Murphy 
believed it was much too early to consider any national or zonal scope 
for German parties. American occupation officials, attempting to keep 
a firm grip on political activity, believed that organization on a state 
or Land basis was sufficient for the time being. 24 
-
The United States continued this "limiting" policy on poll tical 
activity through the campaign for the elections scheduled for its Zone 
tor January 1 1946. The elections were scheduled in the small towns 
where party pall tics would not be significant. Murphy ad.mi tted that the 
22rbid., p. 982. 
23:taszlo Gorgey, "The Influence of Foreign Policy on the 
Development of the Social Democratic Party in Germant" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1964), P• 58. 
24aobert Murpb7 to the Secretary of State, November 301 19451 
FRUS, 1945, Vol. III, P• 1008. 
-
10 
United States was attempting to make these elections renect local 
independent candidates and issues, rather than large party and zonal 
issues.2S This activity took place against the background of a survey, 
conducted by OMGUS,. which revealed that over one-third or the Germans 
in the u.s. Zone favored the SPD, and believed it was best quall.fied to 
26 lead the reconstruction of Germany. 
By the end of the year, Murphy's interest in intemal Geman 
political a.ff airs had become quite obvious. He forwarded an article to 
Secretar;y of State James F. Bymea written by the Bavarian Social Democrat, 
Wilhelm Hoegner, entitled "Federalism, Unitarianism, or Separatism." 
Murphy praised Hoegner as the "leading voice in Germany for a federal 
state." Hoegner•s support of federalism had helped him to become a 
favorite of American occupation officials. Roegner had tried to make a 
clear distinction between federalism and separatism, not wanting to be 
accused of splitting up Germany. However, Murphy knew that Hoegner•s 
position was in the minority in the SPD, which generally preferred a 
centralized unitarian state to a federal goverrmient, and he was conoenied 
whether or not Hoegner1 s ideas could gain support. 27 
The strong showing by the SPD in the small town elections in 
January 1 gaining a 501000 vote plurality out of 376,ooo votes cast, 
surprised American officials. The press was cautioned. not to take the 
�Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, December 121 1945, 
�· ,  p. 1015. 
26 .Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, eds., Public Opinion 
in Occupied Germg: The OMGUS Surveys, 1.9_�42 (Urbana, Illinois, 
university of Illinois""Press, i970), P• l  
27Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, December 271 19451 
mus, 191.i.5, Vol. III, p. 1022. 
11 
results as a national trend, but officials seemed disturbed that the CDU 
did not make a better showing. c. L. Abcock, an OMGUS official, played 
down the SPD victory by claiming that party platforms had not yet been 
formalized, and the elections had been personality contests.28 Although 
no one admitted it openly, OMGUS seemed clearly concerned with the 
strength of the SPD in the American Zone. 
As the German parties became more widely organized, they began 
to develop more definite programs. At the Zonenbeirat*'meeting of J\pril 31 
1946, the SPD pushed through strong resolutions calling for immediate 
econoJlli.c unitJ and the eventual political unification of Germany, which 
it tel t would aid greatly the recovery or Europe. 29 
Later that same month, during a meeting of the Konwandatura, the 
four paver control council in Berlin, the United States once again 
voiced its official policy of neutrality toward individual political 
parties and factions. However, it stated that it was oppo sed to 
allowing, within the parties, small groups of leaders to override the 
wishes or the majori. ty. 30 This was an admirable policy, but it is 
ditticul t t.o justify how the United States could e:xpound such a policy 
p • .3. 
� 
. 
!!!! ,!2!!. l'intea (Hereafter cited as N.Y.T.), January 22, 1946, 
29 John Gimbel The American Occupation ot Gemg: Poli tics and ·· 
the Mili�, 19Y?-124fTstanrord, cil1rorn!as Stanford Univers!ty Press, 
1908), P• • 
30aobert Murphy to the Secretary of State, April 13, 1946, 
u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Statess 
Diplo!'1,.•;t.is Papers, 1946, Vol. V, the Bri ti8h CoiiiliO'nwealf.Ii; Westem and 
Central Europe (Washington, o.c.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1969), 
P• 720. 
*The Zonanbetrat was the Zonal Advisory Council in the British Zone. 
12 
while it was becoming increasingly opposed to the SPD in the American 
�one. 
Elections were held in the larger towns and rural cowities in the 
.American Zone during the final week in April of 1946. The conservative 
parties won a majority, but the number of votes cast was less than in 
previous elections, and the results were not sufficient to forecast how 
a national election might be decided. Jl The SPD was quick to charge 
after the elections that the United States was "stacking the cards" in 
favor of their "reactionary" opponents. It had become evident to 
observers that Germany was being squeezed between extremes, with each 
occupying power trying to build its zone into a carbon copy of its 011n 
political and economic system. This was true in the East and West.32 
On May 26, two days before the elections in the large cities in 
the .American Zone, Kurt Schwnacher made what the New York Times called 
----
"the most significant speech" by a German since the end of the war, in 
which he lashed out at occupation policies. Schumacher called for amnesty 
for Oemans who had joined the Nazi movement at an age when they were 
too yowig to know any better. He also claimed that German guilt was 
interwoven with international guilt, and he told the United States that, 
aa a world power, it now had a responsibility toward Europe. The SPD 
leader protested the extensive deindustrialization of Germany, since 
Germany could not live on "charity", and he claimed there could be little 
hope for a democratic German nation it the Ruhr were separated from the 
rest of Germany. He also condemned the Western Powers for failing to 
Jlw.I.T., May 6, 1946, p. 8. 
32 Ibid., P• 9. 
-
lJ 
break up "big capitalism,," which he asserted had helped bring on the 
3.3 war. Thia open criticism of American occupation policy certainly did 
nothing to endear Schumacher and the SPD to OMGUS officials. 
Throughout the sumer of 1946,, Schumacher continued to attack 
occupation policies. Speaking in Frankfurt, located in the .American 
Zone, he told an audience of five thousand people that "the Germans want 
either all of Potsdam or none of it." He again criticized the policy of 
dismantling Germm industry,, and he emphasized that if Germany could not 
have her industry, then she must at least have the economic unity promised 
at Potsdam in order to survive. The SPD chairman confronted American 
free enterprise ideology with the statement that "sociallsm11 was the 
"surest way to disarmamentn and demanded the socialization of industry 
and agriculture. Schumacher maintained that Hitler would never have 
come to pPWer if German hea-vy industry had been socialized.34 
While 1 t is doubtful that Schumacher had any effect on it, 
American policy toward Germany began to change in the summer of 1946. 
There were indications of the coming change even before that time. The 
House Special Committee on Post-war Economic Policy and Planning had 
concluded in November of 1945 that the stringent controls on German 
economic growth had to be relaxed if Gemany was to be able to produce 
enough to provide its ovn population even a minimal standard of living, 
and resume its place as a vital component in the European economy.JS 
3�.Y.T., May 6• 1946. P• 8. 
34Ibid., June 24, 1946, p. 6. 
3Su.s. Congress, House, Eighth Report gf !!'!.! House Special 
Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning: Economic Reconstruction 
!!! Europe '{Washington, D.c.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1945), P• 33. 
A prosperous free economy in Germany was now seen to be vital for 
European reconstruction. Allen Dulles voiced this general opinion in 
1946 when he declared that if the United States failed to make a free 
economy work 1n Germany, the communists would use this failure as a 
strong argument tor their own system. )6 
The change in policy was evident to observers in Germany, and 
the !!!! � Times reported on June 24, 1946 that American policy was 
shifting .from an emphasis on de-militarization, de-industrialization, and 
de-nazi£ieation to re-education and the solution of economic problems. 
OMGUS officials voiced the opinion that, unless economic difficulties 
were solved, there would be littJ.e hope for democracy in Germany • .37 
On September 6, 1946, Secretary of Stat.a James F. Byrnes delivered 
a speech at Stuttgart which many historians view as a turning point in 
American :policy toward Germany. Byrnes was encouraged by General Clay 
to make a palicy statement 1n Germany which could help Clay in his 
occupation policies and which would also be a response to Russian 
intransigence on Geman problems. 38 
Byrnes called for an abandonment of the strict controls on 
German economic growth as had been directed in JCS 1067 and asked for an 
increasingly productive German economy. He maintained that conditions in 
Germany at that tbte prevented the attainment or even the low levels or 
industrial production on which the allies had agreed. He stated that 
economic unity was necessary in order for Germany to solve its pressing 
J6Lloyd c. Gardner, ••America and the German Problem, 1945-49," in 
Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. by Barton J. 
Bemstein TChicago: Qlladrangle Books, 1970) • P• 136. 
1947). 
37!-!.Y.T., June 24, 1946, p. 6. 
38James F. Byrnes, Jpeaking �--rankly (New York: 
p. 187. 
Harper and Brothers, 
economic problems, and he proposed central agencies to carry out currency 
reform. control inflation, and ad."Tlinister industry and foreign trade. 
The Secretary declared that Germany had to be allowed to produce enough 
so that it could export and purchase imports, and thus make its economy 
self sustaining. He voiced what was now the official American opinion, 
stating that German recovery was essential to general European recovery. 
Byrnes also called for steps to be taken to form a national council to 
draft a federal constitution.39 
An industrially based party such as the SPD should have welcomed 
policies which would have aided industrial growth. However, one can be 
certain that the kind of economy envisioned by a South Carolinian such 
as Byrnes was not a socialist one. Another segment of the speech also 
boded ill .for the SPD1 s plans. Byrnes called for the German political 
system to be rebuilt from the ground up with a decentralized politic al 
structure based on local responsibility as the ultimate objective.40 
This concept would not sit well with Social Democrats who viewed a 
strong centralized state as essential for Germany• s future. 
John Gimbel does not believe Byrnes speech at Stuttgart was a 
shift in policy but was merely a maneuvering within the limits set 
up at Potsdam to meet the needs of Germany in 1946.41 However, the 
consensus among historians is that the speech was a departure. Barton 
Bernstein and Lloyd Gardner believe the speech indicated a shift in 
39James F. Byrnes, 11A Self Governing Germany," Vital Speeches .2£. 
,!:!!! Q!l., XII (September 15, 1946), 708. 
40James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankl.y, P• 190. 
4lJohn Gimbel, 110n the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: 
An Essay on Postwar German Policy, 11 ?oli tic al Science Quarterly, LY ... XXVII 
(January, 1972), 246. 
l6 
response to Soviet attitudes while some, such as Harold Zink and Eugene 
Davidson, stress the et.rect the change in policy had upon the attitudes 
o! the Germans.42 In any case, the United States was now committed 
to restoring the German economy to a level consistent with European 
recovery, and the call for an assembly to discuss a constitution indicated 
that American policy favored some .fom of a new German state. 
The first year and a half of the oc upation had thus seen American 
policy toward Gemany shift t.rom one of strict punitive measures to one 
of restoring Germany to a place in the European state system, with a 
federal governmental structure and a free enterprise system based upon 
the United States model. This same period also saw the SPD grow from a 
small group of persecuted politicians into a strongly organized party, 
with a definite program of socialization and centralization. The period 
after September 6, 1946 would see these two opposing philosophies for 
Germany come into increasing confiict. However, before discussing the 
development of that conflict, it is necessary to examine the controversy 
over the Socialist Unity P art.y, the SED. 
42tloyd Garnder in Politics and Policies, p. 134; Barton Bernstein, 
".American Foreign Polley and the Origins of the Cold War," in Politics,!!!!! 
Policies, P• 50; Harold Zink, .!!!!. United States!!! Germany, l�LJi:$5 
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van :Nostrand Corqpany 1 19575, p. 9 ; and Eugene 
Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American 
Occupation-rN'ew York:.A!.t'redA. Knopf, 19bi'), P• 146:- -
CHAPTER III 
THE UNIT"'...D STATES AND THE S&D OONTROVERSY 
On September 14, 194.5, Otto Grotewohl, an SPD leader in Soviet 
occupied Berlin, told a crowd of over 2500 part7 members that the time 
was right for the SPD and KPD to overcome their past d.U'.f'erences and 
cooperate with one another to form a sincere "united working class 
tront. "43 This was the beginning or the attempt by the pro-Soviet 
left wing of the SPD, with Russian backing, to form a single working 
class party, a Socialist Unity Party. 
The attempts to force the merger between the SPD and the KPD are 
worth stucs,1ng, because they continued for over a year, and they 
indicated the coming breakdown in East-West relations regarding Gemany. 
However, the SED affair is also important, because it marks the one 
major instance during the occ upation in which the SPD in the westem 
Zones received full American support. 
The United States paid close attention to the attempts to merge 
the two working cl.ass parties. On October 151 1945, Murphy reported to 
Secretary Byrnes that the KPD was pushing to form a single party. Hie 
indications were that, except in Berlin and the Soviet Zone where 
Russian pres sure could be felt more strongly, the SPD was having none 
of it. 44 
4�.Y. T. ,  September 151 1945 , P• 8 .  
44Robert Murphy to th e  Secretary of State, December 291 194.5, 
�- 1945, Vol. I I I ,  P •  993.  
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By January of 1946, the SPD in the Western Zones was openly 
criticizing the call for the merger, which was not only proposed for 
the Soviet Zone but also for the three Western Zones. SPD leaders 
claimed that Berlin officials had no jurisdiction to call for such a 
18 
move . Besides, until the KPD had proved its new democratic and national 
charac ter, the SPD would no t  even consider such an idea. 45 
SchWlilacher, who already hated the KPD for i t1:1. responsibility 
for the tall ot Weimar, had decided that the proposed. unity party would 
be no more than a puppet or the Soviet Union. His strong stance against 
the merger helped solidify his position as the SPD leader since the vast 
majority of SPD members agreed with his position.46 
Murph7 believed certain elements of the SFD in Berlin and the 
Ru ssian Zone might have favored the merger with the XPD, but on the 
whole the concept was not popular. SPD sources to 'Whom Murphy had access 
told him that they resented the at temp ta ot the Berlin central comm:l ttee 
to interfere in the politics of another zone, as well a s  the concept of 
the merger itself. SchW!lacher based his opposit.ion to the merger on the 
grounds that the KPD was the representatiw ot a "foreign imperial power. " 
Murphy was afraid that the Soviet Union would put pressure on S?D leaders 
in its zone to force them to accept the merger. 47 One c an  see in the 
merger issue the difi'erences over Germany which were developing 'between 
the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. In this instance the United 
4SN . Y. T. , January JO, 1946, P• l.4. 
46John Allen M8XW'ell, t1Soeial Democracy in a Divided Germany: 
Kurt Schumacher and the German C)lestion" ( unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 
West Virginia University, 1969 } , P •  73. 
47Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, January 9, 1946, 
�' 1946, Vol. V, P• 701. 
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States could better protec t its hopes for a capitalistic Germany by 
suppo rting an independent SPD. If the merger were allowed to take place 
in the Western Zones it would likely provide a majority tor the opponents 
of the free enterprise system, as well as increase Soviet innuence in 
Western Germany. Supporting the SPD in its oppo sition to the merger 
would thu s be consistent with American policy for Gel"Jllany. 
Murphy' s fears o f Soviet p ressure were soon realized when the �D 
reversed its earlier decision and agreed to a conference to consider 
the merger. Grotewohl planned the meeting for April 7. The Russians were 
pressing hard for the amalgtmtation of the t1«> parties and were threatening 
to arrest SPD delegate s in the Soviet Zone who did not support the 
Russian position. Grotewohl ' s decision had come after Schumacher and 
other Western SPD leaders had refu sed to consider any conference on the 
merger or cooperation with the Eastern SPD, 'Which was already' controlled 
by the Soviets. Murphy believed that Grotewobl. felt he had no choice 
but to yield to Soviet pressure, since he had no support .from the 
We st. 4B The British had come to view this pressure as the opening phase 
or a Russian plan to communize all or Germany. 49 
Grotewohl soon found that he had little support from hi s  local 
party as well. At a Berlin SPD meeting to discuss the proposed merger, 
delegates demonstrated for over ten minu tes against Grotewohl. Americ an 
officials claimed that over eighty per cent of the delegates had voted 
against the merger concept. They had demanded secret ballots for the 
48 Ibid. , P •  70). 
-
49.Ambassador Gallam to the Secretary of State, February 27 , 1946, 
� .  p. 7o6. 
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question to guard against po s sible Soviet reprisals. The results tended 
to confirm Schumacher • s belief that only a small UJinori ty outside the 
Russian Zone would support the merger. Many American offici als ,  who viawed 
the merger aa an attempt by the KPD to gain innuence in greater 
propo rtion than 1 ts electoral strength, believed the results of the 
meeting would probably convince the KPD not to push the merger outside the 
Soviet Zone in April. SO The United States had also decided to take all 
.feasible means to protect any SPD members whose safety might be threatened 
bec ause of their oppo sition to the merger.Sl 
On March 20, Kathleen McLaughlin reported that the Russians were 
imprisoning opponents of the merger in Buchenwald and other concentration 
c amps. Wilhelm Pieck, the KPD leader, said it was imperative that the 
merger take place by March )1., so that the new party could begin creating 
conditions which would elindnate the need for the occupation. Publicly 
the Uni ted States was maintaining a position of neutrality in the affair, 
while Great Britain, F!'ance, and the Sov.1.et Union openly backed their 
respective "p:roteges." 'lhe United States drew criticism from some corners 
for its poai tion which would "open the door to dangerous elements in the 
political system. n52 However, privately, American policy was anything but 
neutral. 
Murphy believed that mo st of those who favored the merger were 
more interested in the ttSo cialist" portion of Social Democracy, while 
tho se who oppo sed it were concerned with the "democratic " content. 
$0 N . Y. T. ,  March 21 1946, P •  2 .  
Sl..aobert Murphy to the Sec retax-y o f  State, March 13, 1946, 
FRIJS1 1946, Vol. V 1 P• 709 . 
S�.Y. T� 1  March 20, 1946, P •  10 . 
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Thi s  statement is renective of Murphy' s opposition to socialization as 
well as the .American position in general. He had now decided that 
Gro tewohl had abandoned democratic principles in the hope of achieving a 
socialist state. Compared to this active preaching or "class struggle, " 
Schumacher• s brand of social democracy wa s much more accep table to the 
United States. Murphy believed that the SPD feared the retu.m to power 
of reactionary capitalist forces and would cooperate with the western 
oc cupiers in order to p revent it.SJ 
On March 26, the Berlin SPD executive council approved holding a 
referendum to decide the merger question. The discussion came about 
partially due to criticism within the party, but primarily becau se ol 
Deputy Military Gove.mer Lucius D. Clay ' s announcement that the merger 
would no t  be recognized in the u . s. sector unless the mass of the party 
approved it, not j ust the execu tive committee . In protest, the pro­
merger group s  decided to boycott the referendum. They would only vote 
on the question at the party conference scheduled for mid-April. The 
United States intended to observe the referendum clo sely to make certain 
it wa s c onducted democratically.54 
The ref erendwa was held on March 3l in Berlin. However, the 
police in the Soviet Zone clo sed polling places and seized voting lists 
to prevent the referendum from taking place. They also harassed reporters 
attempting to cover the election. In the Weatern Zones, the vo te was 
over seven to one against the merger. Even former KPD strongholds f'ailed 
53Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, March 20, 1946, 
FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, P• 711. 
54Robert Murphy to the Secr etary of State, March 29, 1946, 
�. , P• 714. 
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to support it. 55 The large majo rity against the merger did not prevent 
the Soviet Union from continuing to push the idea. It .forced the SPD 
executive committee, which was by then under Soviet control, to call 
tor an immediate combination of the party organization, even before the 
April convention.56 To counteract these actions, the anti-merger portion 
of the SPD asked permi ssion to hold a convention in the American Zone 
on April 7. The request was granted by the United States, in the hope 
of bringing the entire question under discussion in the Kommandatura. 57 
The convention was held as scheduled, and, to the surprise of 
no one, it vo ted out Grotewobl and the other leaders who had supported 
the merger. K arl Germer, Franz Newmann, and Kurt Swolinsk.Y were named 
new co-chairmen by a vote of 484 to l .  They maintained that th e  old 
58 leadership had tried to sell the party out to the KPD. 
As expected, the United States with British and French support 
b acked the recognition of the newly elected chairmen, while the Soviet 
Union asked that the ma tter be dropped. The Western powers replied that 
the question was important and suggested that the Komma:ndatura officially 
recognize th.at the SPD was split over the merger issue and call tor those 
who wished to join with the KPD to do so,  while the SPD remained 
independent. The Soviets still refused to discuss the matter at that 
time.S9 
SS N . Y. T. , April 11  1946, P• l .  
S�bert Murphy to the Secretary of State,, April 5,  1946, 
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59Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State , April 13, 1946, 
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Despite the referendum against the merger, the SPD and KPD in the 
Russian Zone joined forces on April l4 and declared the formation of the 
Socialistiohe Einheits Partei ( SED) . Grotewohl predicted that the merger 
would soon spread to the Western Zones. People who attended the meeting 
had to swear that they had not taken part in the previous meeting which 
had ousted Grotewohl .  The n ew  S ED  declared that Soviet assistance would 
be best for Germany. The Communists would dominate the SPD members 1n 
60 the new party because the latter still ttneeded training. " On April 21, 
Grotewohl decl ared that the dream of working class unification had 
finally been achieved. However, primarily due to Schumacher' s  tireless 
efforts against them, attempts to promote the merger in the We stern Zones 
6l 
were tailing. 
American officials v.Lewed this controversy with increasing concern. 
It was obvious that attempts to force the merger h ad hurt quadripartite 
control. The SED was continuing to function without official. permi ssion 
while the SPD was being forced to Hlay low" in the Soviet Zone. Murphy 
decided that, if the Soviet Union refu sed to make the SED submit to 
Kommandatura control, the United States should act as if the SPD were 
authorised in the other zones. To Murphy, the issue was now much greater 
than a simple matter of merging political p arties. 62 
The SED question was passed on to the Allied Control Council. 
Gene!'al K alikov, the Soviet representative, pressed for imediate 
60 N . Y. T. ,  April 15, 1946, P• 1. 
61rbid., April 22, 1946, P•  10. 
62Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, April 13, 1946, 
FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, P• 721. 
recognition of the SED. The United States attempted to trade Westem 
rGcognition in retum for Soviet recognition of the SPD, but the French 
oppo sed this since the SPD had voted against a merger. France was 
willing to recognize the SED as a new party, but not a fused one. The 
Berlin SPD chairman, Germer, wrote the council that the SPD needed 
allied support and that its policies had not changed simply becau se  a 
small group had bolted to the SED.63 
With the merger of the SPD and KPD in the Soviet Zone and tho 
inability of the Control Council to solve the problem, the SEO at.fair 
moved to the background. However, it was by no means out of sight, and, 
e specially with the attempts to complete a merger in the Westem Zones, 
the United States and the SPD still had to deal with the question 
periodically for over a year. 
I 
The Soviet Union was doing nothing to make the problem any more 
solvable. On July 18, 1946, the SPD lead.Grs met in the Soviet sector 
of Berlin to protest the Ru ssian ' s  unfair treatment of the SPD. The 
Ru ssians had been forcing the SPD to submit speeches prior to their 
delivery, requiring complete personal data on all SPD leaders, and had 
forbidden the distribution 0£ a leaflet written by Schu:macher. 64 The 
SPD' s position ot independence had done nothing to endear it to the 
Russians, and there wa s little hope that the situ ation was going to 
improve. 
The SPD, however, was not halted by Russian harassment, and it 
continued to pre s s  .forward its principles. During the election campaign 
6�.Y. T. , April 27, 1946, P• 4. 
64 �· 1 July 19 1 1946, P •  4. 
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in Saxony in l ate sunnner, the SPD openly and vehemently attacked the 
SED. It placed its own po sters over tho se of the SED, acousing the SJID 
of working toward a communist dictatorship,, one which had already taken 
root. 6S The SPD was not giVing in to Russian pressure withou t a :fight,, 
and this attitude evidently paid off in the Berlin elections in October, 
in which the SPD finished ahead of the SED in the SED• s own stronghold, 
the Russian sector. 66 
In return for its election successes, the SPD came under the 
brunt of a vicious Soviet prop aganda campaign. Pravda accused Schumacher 
of being a new fuehrer and condemned his recent trip to Great Britain. 
The Russians accused SPD members of joining the Nazis in droves in the 
1930' s. Sch11macher denied the charges and said that he was certain that 
Mo scow could forgive him for being a tuehrer, but never for being a 
deroocrat. He also denied that he wa s a tool of the Western democracies 
67 and proclaimed hi s independence. 
In January of 1947, the Komandatura again took up the problems 
between the SPD and the SED. The United States objected to the Soviet 
Union • s refusal to permit .freedom or action for other parties in its 
zone while openly supporting the SED. The United States representative 
pressed tor a return of responsibility to German elec ted bodies as soon 
68 as was possible. 
65N.Y. T. ,  September 8• 1946, P • 28. 
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Soon after this meeting, 1 t was rumored that the Soviet Union 
would be willing to allow the SPD to operate in its zone if SED 
leaders, such as Grotewohl, would be allowed to rejoin the SPn.69 This 
would be like asking the proverbial fox to guard the chickens. However, 
the Rus sians pressed ahead with their plans. Schumacher was invited to 
discuss with SED leaders how the SPD might be allowed to retum to t he 
Soviet Zone. Schumacher considered the offer bec ause he knew hi s 
.followers in the Soviet Zone wanted the SPD to retum. He told the 
Ru ssians that he would be happy to re-establish the SPD in their zone, 
but he would accept no deal s  to attain this in which he would be 
expected to carry out Russian wishes. 70 
These attempts to "woo " the SPD were part or a Soviet effort to 
build the SED into a national party. On March 8, SED leaders came into 
the American Zone to promote a merger of the working class parties in the 
We st. They hoped to set up collaboration with the SPD on the trip . A 
formal merger could take place later.71 
At Munich, Otto (lrotewohl declared the KPD in the Westem Z.Ones 
might change its name to SEO. The result li!Ould give the weak KPD a 
formal union w1 th the powerful, Soviet backed S:&D. Even though Schumacher 
opposed such a move, American observers believed some dissident left wing 
members of the SPD might be dratm in under the new name.72 
69N . Y. T. ,  January 101 1947, P •  J. 
701oid. , January 24, 1947, P• 9 .  
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The attempt by the Soviets to face the We stern allies with a 
� acconpli on the merger i s sue l eft the United States indecisive. 
OMGUS felt, at that time,, that it would not be wise to forbid the 
KPD to change its name to SEO since it would draw so few SPD :members 
27 
that the myth that the SED was a 11uni ty11 party would. soon be dispell ed. 
However,, it realized that the resulting party would be larger than the 
original KPD. The main argument against granting the name change , however, 
was that it would mean allowing the undemocratical y founded SED to 
operate freely in the u . s .  Zone without reciprocity for the SPD in the 
Soviet Zone . Opponents ot granting the change believed it wo uld be 
throwing away a "trump cardtt which could be used to correct the political 
situation in the Russian Zone. This group thought the United States might 
require a referendum of SPD and K?D members in the American Zone to decide 
the issu� democratically. They also wanted to make it cle ar to the 
Russi an !'J  th at authorizing the SED would hinge upon their adherence to 
equal rights for all p arties, including the SPD in the Soviet Zone . 73 
The State Department decided that the danger of allowing the SED 
into the American Zone was less than what the United States might gain 
by the surprise of p emi tting it. Washington decided that OMGUS should 
allow the SED to operate, contingent on equal rights £or the SPD in the 
Russian Zone.74 
This decision wa s oppo sed by Walter Bedell Smith, the American 
ambassador in Mo scow., who viewed the whole S.BD affair a s  a step in the 
7.3nonaJ.d Heath to the Secretary of State, March 15, 1947, 
FRUS, 1947,, Vol. II, P• 857. 
74The Secretary of  State to Donald Heath, March 211  1947,  
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Soviet plan to increase 1 ts influence in the Western Z.Ones. Failure to 
resist the intrusion of the SED into the .American Z.One would hurt 
democratic progressive elements, and to permit the name change without 
a quid pro quo offer £or the SPD from the Soviets would be pl aying right 
into their hands. Smith believed that by allowing the SED leaders to 
tour the American Zone, OMGUS was subverting precisely wh at it was 
suppo sed to be supporting. 7S 
By early April , the United States had still not decided whether 
to c all for a referendum or ask for a quid pro guo agreement. Schumacher 
further complicated the situation by decl aring he believed the United 
States should authorize the SED to operate in the u. s. Zone. He was 
certain this would closely identify the SED and communist cause more 
closefy with the Soviets. As tar a s  the political numbers were concerned, 
76 the SED would not be that much larger than the KPD that already existed. 
On April 11, 1946, Mayor Otto Ostrowski received a vote or no 
confidence from the Berlin city council due to his delay in eliminating 
excessive numbers of communists from city government. The SPD pl anned 
to elect Ernst Reuter, a strong man and a vigorou s anti-communist, as 
n ew  Lord Mayor. The Soviet Union and the French opposed Reuter, while the 
United States and Great Britain supported him. Since a unanimous vote 
was required for a c andidate to be confirmed., the Soviet Union could 
block Reuter ' s  election. In this event, the SPD and CDU planned to 
7SAmbassador Smith to the Assistant Secretary of State, 
March 291 1947, �· 
76nc,nald Heath to the Secretary of State, April 8, 1947, 
�. , P •  861. 
refu se to participate .further in the Berlin c ity government. The SPD 
intended to force a showdown over what democracy meant in regards to 
Berlin. 77 
O strowski resigned on April 17, but the Soviet member of the 
Control CouncU refused to accept his resignation. The SED press 
29 
attacked the SPD and coo for forcing hi s  decision to resign, and the 
Soviet Union did its best to p revent the non-communist majority from 
having its way . The Ru ssians cl aimed the SPD forced O strowski out because 
he was friendly to them. They also bl amed Americ an intrigues for causing 
the SPD to act as it did. American officials countered that the issue 
really was whether or not the allies were willing to let the Germans 
govern themselvea. 78 
On April 2), Colonel William Howley, an Ameri can occupation 
officer, told a press conference that the Berlin city government should 
decide the question itself. He maintained that a year before, the United 
States wuld no t  have cared which party controlled the government as long 
as it had been elected legally. He accused the Soviet Union of teying to 
de stroy the SPD. 79 
OMGUS put an end to one stage ot the SED controversy on May 3 
when it made its decision on the application of the KPD in the u. s .  Zone 
to merge with the SED of Berlin. The United States said permission was 
denied becau se, "while the SED party claims to represent an amalgamation 
77Donald Heath to the Secretary of State, April 14, 1947, 
Ibid. 
-
78nonald Heath to the Secretary of State, April 23, 1947, 
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of the Social Democra ts and the Communist Parties, no requ est has been 
received from the So cial Democratic leaders to j oin the propo sed merger. " 
0}1GUS had decided that it could not permit a change in name by the 
Bavarian KPD which would imply a merger that had not occurred. The United 
States reiterated.t for public consumptio n no doubt• that it -wo uld not 
oppo se voluntary mergers on a r.onal basia. 80 
ll stalemate wa s  reached which, for all practical purpo ses, ended 
the controversy over the SED when, on J une 18, 1947, the United States 
Military Governor, Lucius D. Cla'6 indefinite]¥ barred the SEO .from 
operat.:ing in the American Zone. 81 The United States had oppo sed the 
merger tor several reasons. First, and this was the offici3lly profes sed 
reason, the merger was an attempt to .force a new political party onto 
Germany, East and West. Secondly, relations with the Soviet Union 
concerning Germany had been deteriorating, and OMGUS had no desire for 
increased SoViet in!luence in the .American Zone and Western Zones in 
general , which would have come about as a reault of the SED• s introduction 
into the West. Finally, it the SPD and KPD had merged, it wo uld have been 
the largest party in the u . s .  Zone. As such , it could have been a serious 
threat to American hopes tor the future of free enterprise in Germany. All 
o f  these factors led OMGUS to support Kurt Schwqacher in his attempts to 
maintain the independence of the SPD. However, even as the United States 
and the SPD were s tanding side by side on the merger issue , they were drifting 
farther ap art becau se of their conflicting plans tor the .future of post-
war Germany. 
80Press release f'rom OMGUS Headquarters,  May 31  1947, 
�. , P•  866. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DEVELOPMElJT OF .AMERICAN OPPOSITION 'ID THE SPD 
Although the confrontation with the Soviet Union over the SED 
held much of the Military Government ' s  attention during 1946 and 1947, it 
was no t  the United States ' sole concern. The Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart 
in September of 1946 had given a more definite form to American plans 
tor post-war Germany. At the s ame time, the German political parties 
had reached a stage of organization in which they were now promoting 
de.tini te programs. The American view of Germany• s future wa s much 
different than the view of the SPD, and thus, the stage was set for 
a growing hostility between them. The period from September 1946 until 
June of 1948 revealed how far from neutrality in German political affairs 
the Uni ted States ' position really was. 
In early October 1946, SPD Chairman Schumacher made clear what 
he believed was the beet course for Germant to follow. He declared that 
socialization wa s an economic necessity for Germany, and ot the greatest 
political importance for the foundation of demo cracy. He cl aimed that 
democracy had little chance on the 3\lrop ean continent unless it was 
imbedded in Germany, and this could not occur without socialism. 82 This 
speech was an indication of what OMGUS could expect from a fu ture SPD 
dominated government. 
82N.Y. T. , October 14, 1946, P• 5 .  
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General Joseph T. McNarey, the fir st United States Military 
Governor 1 in his comments on the Berlin elections later that same month 
seamed unvilling to concede that the SPD party program had real support 
among the German people when he cl aimed that the SPD' s gaining nearly 
filty per cent of the total vote was real y an expression of dissent 
against the co111Dtunist dominated c ity goveniment and its attempts to force 
the merger. McNarey said that many people may have voted for the SPD out 
of protest, rather than out of support f'or its platform. 83 
This growing trlistrust of the SPD on the part of OMGUS was evident 
to Charles "Chip" Bohlen, an .American State Department otticial who was 
travelling 1n Germany. He :fiold the editor of the SPD newsp aper Freiheit 
his views or the difficulty the SPD was having gaining a favorable image 
among .American officials and the public in general. Bohl.en was reported 
to have naade the .tollowi.ng commentsi 
You se , it is too bad that your p arty always sp eaks with a 
language that will only be understood in Germany". I have always 
understood what you want to say, because I know the German 
situation well. But just imagine an average American politician, 
an average c itizen, when he read.a your statements his reaction is1 
The Germans are never peaceful.. Bymes said something sensible 
to thm, and immediately, they had to throw the baby out with the 
bath. 
Bohlen advised the SPD to work with American journalists who were 
symp athetic. He said there was some support for the SP D  within goverruqent 
circlea. 84 
Bohlen believed the SPD was the "only effective democratic force 
in German11 " but there was no clear concept a s  to what kind of socialism 
8�.Y. T. , October 231 1946, P• 10. 
84John Maxwell, Social Democracy, p .  216. 
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it wanted. He said that the SPD should not a sk  for socialism as such, 
but should voice its de11ands in such a way that .American politicians, 
especially Democrats, see ideas like a "planned economy " as a necessity 
!or Germany. The SPD had to stress tha t socialism was not a "revolutionary 
act any more, but an economic necessity. " Bohlen said socialism was the 
only way to normalize Germany, and he hoped that Schumacher would take 
advantage of the points in Bymes ' speech that could help. BS Unfortunately 
tor the SPD, there were few .American officials who felt as Bohlen did. 
The biggest obstacle the SPD faced in implementing its program 
was Lucius D. Clay, then Deputy Military Governor in the .American Zone 
but soon to be Military Governor. In later years, Schumacher accused 
Clay of having an anti-SPD complex, and more specifically, an anti­
Schumacher complex. The SPJl leader claimed that Clq ' s excessive dewtion 
to free enterprise led him to work against the SPD. B6 
Although .American policy toward the SPD and its program was 
offic ially neutral, OMGUS actions belied that po sition. Clay had shown 
this clearly in 1946 by his reaction to the Hessian constitution. Article 
forty-one of that document cal.led tor the socialization or industry 1 but 
Clay decided that it could only be implemented if' it were approved in a 
separate referendum trom the one which would decide on the constitution 
as a whole. This seems to indicate a hope, in vain, on Clq 1 s  p art that 
the voters would rej ect socialism if it were the only issue they needed 
to decide on. Even after seventy-one p er cent of the voters approvad the 
article, Clay decided it would be " suspended" tor the time being. He 
BS �. , P •  217 .  
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subsequently refused to approve all Hes sian attempts to inplement article 
forty-one. 87 Harold Zink, the official historian for the American 
occupation, confirms that article forty-one was unpopular with Clay. He 
tries to defend Clay' s actions, however, by saying that implementation 
of the article ' s  provisions would have been ver, unpopular with American 
public opinion. 88 
Clay further showed his oppo sition to the socialist goals of the 
SPD in 1946 when he fought .tor an effective decartelization law, which 
he felt w uld deter socialization. When Washington overruled him on the 
issue, he immediately asked for a de!ini te policy statement on socialization. 
The reply was, in effect, that the United States had ri0 objections, as long 
as the decision was reached in a democratic manner. OMOUS asked al.most 
immediately for a reconsideration, since the Berlin City Council had 
recently approved a broad socialization bill tor four power approval . 
Clay obj ected to the bill ' s  failure to provide for "fair compensation, " 
among other things. He also feared that approval of  the bill would 
commit the United States to a policy of socialiS111, "probably withou t  
/Jb.iJ United States or Congress realizing such a basic issue had been 
89 decided. " 
.Although Clay' s "official" policy at the time was to allow the 
German people to decide for or against socialism, whenever they were in 
a position to choo se freely at a national level, bis internal correspondence 
reveals his oppo sition to socialization. He hoped that "free enterprise "  
87 John Gimbel, .'!!!.! American Occupation, p .  117 . 
88Harold Zink, !a! � !!! Germanz, P •  181. 
89Jobn Gimbel, J:a! .American O ccupation, p .  170 . 
would become so firmly e stablished in the meantime that the German people 
would never exercise their right of choice.90 Clay wrote the Secretary 
of the Army that there must be "economic and political stability before 
the German people can be expected to freel,y exercise their views. " Clay 
said, "Time is on our side. If we e an • • • deter the issue while free 
enterprise continues to operate and economic inlprovement results, it may 
never become an issue before the German people. w9l 
In la te December of 1946, the United States and Great Britain 
agreed to an economic union between their zones. Thus t1Bizon1ari was 
formed. This new organization would bring even closer con"liacts between 
the SPD members from both zones, especially since the British Government, 
controlled by the Labour Party, was sympathetic toward the SPD in its 
zone . This would present the United States with an even stronger push 
for socialization in Western Germany. 
One of the early ac tions taken in the organization of Bizonia 
was the fomation of an economic council, comprised of German citizens, 
to coordinate economic measures in the two zones. 
On J anuary 16, 191'7, the SPD took over the Economic Council of 
the Anglo-American Zones by virtue of its strong central party organization. 
After gaining control of the Economic Executive Council, the SPD 1 s first 
act was to oust Dr. Ru.dolph Mueller, a conservative, and replace him with 
Dr. Victor Agartz, Schumacher' s  "right hand man. 11 German politicians 
viewed this move as a setback to American ideas on the course German 
reconstruction should .follow. All or the council :members were Socialists, 
90:rbid. 1 P •  224. 
-
91rbid. 1 P •  170. 
36 
becau se the center parties lacked the necessary inter-zonal party structure 
to overcome the organiz ational superiority of the SFD. Agartz favored a 
dec artelization of industry and strong trade unions ,  while 1'1ueller 1 s  views 
on decartelization were similar to tho se of the United States, and he 
favored little socialization.92 Mueller was understandably bitter over 
the loss of his position, which he claimed was a purely political move, 
and he declared he would form a new anti-so cialist party in Bizonia to 
block Schumacher. 93 
General Clay and General Brian Robertson, the British Military 
Govemor, had to approve the democratic election of Agartz, but in their 
message to the Council they informed its members that they believed 1 t 
would be better if the heads of bizonal agencies had a "reasonable 
continuity" in office . It one were to be removed, it should be only for 
just cause .  They said that consul tations would be held to see if their 
directive was carried out, and they thanked Mueller for his services. 94 
The subsequent moves by the Economic Council to implement the 
SPD program endangered Cl ay ' s policy of making socialization in Geman,y 
difficult, ii' not impossible . Thia did not £aoilitate OMGUS ' attempts to 
maintain the appearance of political neutrality. The election o f  the 
socialist Agartz as Chairll'Jan of the Economic Council infiuenced the 
Military Government to maintain the policy o f assigning as little 
political power as possible to the Gemans, which it had been following 
since the beginning of tb.e o ccup ation. Thi s  policy had been instituted 
9�.Y. T. , January 17, 1947, P• 5 .  




to prevent any po ssible resurgeance of National Socialism, but by 1947 
there were virtually no rea sons for continuing to pursue it. 9$ Clay 
avoided a direc t clash over socialization and thu s kept up a neutral 
appearance by stating that Economic Council enactments did not bind 
37 
Bizonia as laws but were only recommendations. This soon became official 
OMGUS policy. 96 
On January 28, 1947, Schumacher confronted all the occupying 
powers when he wamed them to consider Gemany at the coming Foreign 
Ministers Conference in :¥.o scow. He declared that Germany must not be 
considered an isolated case but a s  a part or a European problem. He said 
that if he were a msnber of a future German government and asked to sign 
a "too harsh" peace,  he would refu se .  S chumacher asserted that Gemans, 
who would sign a treaty, had to be freely elected by all Germany, not 
just appointees of the occupying forces. He confronted American plans 
for Germany by cal.ling for a strong central Reichstag rather than a weak 
senate representing the Laender, or states. Schumacher declared that i.t 
each Land were treated as a sovereign state, it would be Genn&ny'1 S and 
-
Europe ' s ruin.97 Schumacher thus was in direct opposition to .American 
plans tor a decentralized £ederal German state. 
A connict over trade union organization in Berlin about this 
time brought the United States and the SPD into opposition. The United 
States wanted to prevent the Soviet backed SEO from taking over the 
9) John Gimbel, .'.!'.!!!, .American Occupation, P •  118. 
96 Ibid. , P • 119. 
-
97N . Y. T. ,  January 29 ,  1947 , P •  14. 
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Berlin trade unions, by strengthening the SPD for the battle. However, 
the SPD did not want the help,, because it did not wish to do anything 
to split the unions on a sectional. basis , and thus seemingly justify 
SED claims that the SPD was splitting the wrlcing class as a lackey of 
the imp erialistic foreign powers. The coo,, however, reported that it 
would be 'Willing to negotiate in the struggle.98 The United States was 
thus still willing to support the SPD as an ally in the growing 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, but the SPD would have none of it. 
This tact, combined with the willingness of the CDU to go along vi.th 
American policy, did nothing to enhance the .future of the SPD in its 
dealings with OMOUS .  
In mid-March th e  C DU  attempted to organize a me ting of the 
various German political p arties to formulate a joint proposal to submit 
to the & scow Foreign Minister • s Conference. Without the participation 
of the SPD,, however, the recommendations would carry little weight. 99 
Once again, Schumacher refused to cooperate fully with the other parties, 
as the United States would have liked. He agreed to attend, but only on 
his conditions, one of which was that the discussions should be real and 
no t  just the ratifying of something impo aed b;y the occupation powers. 100 
Schumacher continued his independent stance b1' condemning the CDU and 
its Bavarian farmer supporters for leaving much of the responsibility 
for the food shortages in the indu strial areas of We stern Germ8l'l1.lOl 
9SBobert Murphy to the Secretary of State, February 12, 1947, 
FRUS, 1947, Vol. II,, P• 8$2.  
99N.Y. T. , March 18,, 1947,, P• 4. 
l<Xlrbid. , March 19 , 1947, P •  5 .  
101:rbid. ,, March 31, 1947, P •  3. 
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OMGUS received some solace in April when the Bavarian state 
legislature voted down the SPD and neutralized a socialization clause in 
the Bavarian constitution. The SPD was then eJCPected to withdraw from 
the coalition,, which is precisely what Schumacher had wished from the 
beginning. The SPD hoped that new elections would cau se the CSU to 
lose its majority.102 
In April of 1947, Cl91 reported to the War Department that the 
Bizonal Economic Council 11:>uld naturally have a substantial SPD 
maj ority. Clay a ccused the British of collaborating closely with 
Schumacher and supporting his calls for socialization, nationalization of 
indu stry, an increasingly centralized economy, and a strong central 
government. Cl&,1 reiterated his views tha t  Schumacher was a danger 
to American plans for a decentralized, federal Germacy. He felt the 
SPD majority in the counc il would not really reflect the majority of 
103 German opinion. 
Clay believed the conservative parties would be hurt by the 
British propo sal of equal Laender representation, since the CDU and LDP 
(Liberal !)8111.')cratic Party) were concentrated in Bavaria. He said he 
would promote a more proportional representation plan. The United States 
had to come up with a workable alternative or el se face the prospect 
ot accepting aocialiam, or ot being in constant opposition to the British 
and the majority of German opinion. Clay maintained he was no t  opposed 
to socialiSJ11, per .!!i but would only accept 1 t on a vote or the German 
l02t�.Y. T. ,  April 26, 1947, P• 6. 
l03aeneral Clay to the War Department,, April 26, 1947, 
�. , P• 912. 
people, and then only on a Laender ba sis until a central German govern-
ment wa s created. This is precisely what Clay had refu sed to accept in 
the instance of Hesse. Clay stated that American policy should be to 
limit soci alistic controls to as few basic industries as possible, while 
maintaining broad principles of free en terprise. Clay believed the 
German people might support this, since it had been a controlled economic 
104 and social system which had aided Hitler ' s  rise to power. 
Even before this time, Washington had come to share Clay' s fears 
of socialism and a highly centralized organization of Germany. Clay 
was instructed to reduce the chance of this occurring by limiting the 
powers of the Bizonal Council and maintaining his control over its 
legislation. The instructions .from Washington said that the council 
should have a voice in the determination of production, export-import 
levels, and fuel allocation, but the Military Oovemors should keep 
its policies under observation. The powers of the Council did not include 
the right or socialization at the bizonal level. Washington believed that 
it would be better to keep decision making at the Laender level. Clay 
reserved the right to control what he believed was excessive centralization 
by making critical council decisions subject to the agreement of the 
Military Oovernors. 105 
This decision created a situation in which the United States was 
forced to face what its real aims were in its German policies. Since the 
Military Governors had kept their power ot review over council decisions, 
l04Ibid. , P• 913. 
105 John Gimbel, .!h! American Occupation, P •  126. 
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they co uld have given the Laender more power, in the interest 0£ 
federalism. One would expect that OMGUS would have pushed tor the 
Laender to have more power, to encourage and develop federal structures 
tor the Germans to use onoe the Military Government gave up its review 
powers. 11.owever,. granting more power to the Laender would have increasingl,r 
involved their eight Minister Pre sidents, five of whom were Social 
Democrats. The Uni ted States thus resisted Laender innuence at the 
Frankfurt councils. Clay would no t allow the Minister Presidents to 
serve on the Bizonal Executive Committee , bec au se he said it wa s a full 
time job. He also re.f'u sed to define the exac t relationship between the 
committee members and their home governments.106 
Cl ay ' s first decision effectively removed SPD party professionals 
from the inner workings of Bizonia. The second les sened the powar these 
men might have over oonmd ttee members. By re!using to allow the Laender 
to assume a greater degree of power, the United States seemed to be working 
against its own concept or federalism. As John Gimbel ha s said, 11 the 
containment of so cial democrats and sociali• continued to preoc cupy 
Americans • • • • "  107 
A confiict developed between the United States and its British 
ally over just this policy in early May. Victor Agartz had threatened 
to resign, because he claimed that United States au thorities were blocking 
his policies. He even accused the United States o.f' refusing to grant him 
a travel p ermit in order to thwart hi s activities.108 
106 
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United States resented British attemp ts to actively force socialism on 
Bizonia. American officials once again voiced their "official " line 
that they had no objections to socialism if the German people freely 
selected it. F.owever, they felt that the Germans were not 1et ready 
to assume the powers inherent in such a system. United States officials 
accused A.gartz of liking to "play dictator" and of not understanding 
OMGUS 1 insistance on a slow, evolutionary development of Germany as the 
only way to insure the success of the American occupation. American 
policy m akers were not placing German economic recovery above "world 
peace and security, 11 which they accused the British of doing. Clay had 
resisted a "quick cure tt for Germany ' s problems. The United States believed 
tha t  economic centralization implied political centralization, and 
Germ81'lJ' was not believed to be ready to be trusted with such power 1et. 
In fact, some occupation officials believed it wa s  still really too 
early to have given the Germans the power they had alreact¥ been granted.109 
Great Britain and the United States finally reached a compromise 
agreement on the future of Bizonia. The main points of contention had 
been. once again, British desires for increased powers for the bizonal 
councils and socialism in both zones b1 impo sition. The United States 
opposed both these concepts .  In return for American concessions on the 
aforementioned powers for the council over economic matters, the British 
agreed to drop their plans for so cialism ,.  as far as Bi.zonia was concerned. 
110 This was viewed as a great victory for Clay ' s  plans for Germany. 
109N . Y. T. ,  May 6, 1947, P• 8. 
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Shortly after the compromise between the United States and 
Britain, Schumacher began an extended sp eaking tour on which the United 
States, and the Soviet Union, came under his increasing attack. He 
blamed bizonal economic policies for causing the severe food sho rtage 
and demanded that Germany be allowed to export more manufactured goods 
in order to purchase food imports. Schumacher said, 11Germany mu st 
export. 11111 He condemned "reckless world politicians" for mi susing the 
German people in a struggle between Zast and West. He told the Soviets 
tha t "Europe must be demo cratic, 11 while he informed the Americans that 
"Europe must be so cialistic. " He vowed Germany would not sell itself 
to either side •112 
Closing t.�e tour at Nuremberg, Schumacher called on the Western 
Powers to sp eed the economic reconstruction of Germany a s  a bulwark against 
Oommunism .  H e  said the economic prosperity of Germany could be of 
grea t  importance in deciding the developing struggle between East and 
West. Schumacher praised the Marshall Plan and admitted that Europe 
had no choice but to accept. A German collap se would be near unless 
general help c ame soon. The key to the question was, to Schumacher, 
the dismantling of We st German industry. He still maintained that 
Germany would have to play the major role in European recovery.113 
The SPD again con.fronted the United States in June shortly after 
the opening of the Bizonal Economic Council. The is sue was again 
111,<T y 'f' ¥ 19 191 . 7  7 .. . ... . .. . , i i.Sy , 4 • P• • 
112Ibid. , June 2, 1947, P• 11. 
113Ibid. , June JO, 194'7, P• 9.  
centraliz ation versus federalism. The SPD objected to the 11r1ghtest 
tendency11 of seat distribution in the council. The CDU opposed attempts 
by the SPD to gain the po sitions of Director of Economics and Director 
of Finance . This conflict stalled the working of bizonal agencies.ll4 
The opening of the Council .faced the United States with two 
choice s .  It could either issue direc t binding orders to the Laender, 
or it  could grant increased power to the Germans in the council at 
Frankfurt. !�either choice was attractive to Clay. The fir st was 
unfeasible due to the growing prop aganda war between the 5oviet Union 
and the We st. The second was even more so because the United States 
wanted to maintain control over its heavy financial inve stment in 
Germany, continue the fiction that the Bizonal Economic Council was an 
economic and not a political o rganization, and, finally, to make certain 
that the SPD did not gain through administration what it had failed to 
gain politic ally . The result was that no choice was made , but policy 
nuctuated. 115 
In August, the American military government in Bremen su spended 
for one week the publishing privileges of the local SPD paper .for 
violating an order to submit all political material prior to public ation. 
However, the penalty was light, bec ause, observers claimed, the United 
States believed tha violation was inadvertent. The Bremen government, 
in order to preserve its image of neutrality, had to impose some sanctions 
ll6 since it had done it to the KPD in the p a st. 
ll4John Gimbel, The American Occupation, P• 186. 
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In order to meet the increasing protests that he was 'WOrking 
against the sPD, Clay explained his po sition to the Laenderrat, the 
Council or States as represen ted by their Minister Presidents, on 
September 9 .  He claimed that much o f  what had been said about OMGUS 1 
opposition to socialization of indu stry had been "distorted and 
inaccurate. " Clay told the Germans that although the .All1erican people 
believed in the tree enterprise system which had brought them great 
material wall being, they believed even more in d81110cracy. Therefore, 
according to Clay, tmY German state could decide upon socialism for its 
own area. 117 
Clay' s statement was a reaffirmation or a policy announced by 
the u . s .  State Department in August of 1947 which declared that the 
United States did not oppose demo cratic socialization as long as 
foreign property owners were compensated. US The catch was, however, 
that Clay ruled that if the socialized indu strie s overlapped into the 
other Laender or if people in other areas were a!f ected, the soc ialization 
would have to be approved by all the German people, whenever a government 
c�able or expressing their n�tional will had been established. 119 In a 
highly indu strialized country such as Germany it would be ditticult to 
find any industry that did no t arre t the lives of people in other 
Laender to some degree. Thus, Clay aad again maintained his "neutral " 
position, while e!i"eotively blocking the at.tempts for socialization. 
117 N .Y. T. , September 10,  1947 , P •  10. 
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A crisis in Bavaria cau sed the end of the coalition government 
less than a week after Clay •  s Laenderrat sp eech. The results should have 
pleased Clay, as the SPD, after ac cusing the CSU of failing to live up 
to its end of a bargain about socialization measures, left the government. 
The f'our SPD members who le.rt the cabinet were soon replaced by members 
of the csu .120 
During this same month, Schumacher ' s  first and only visi t  to 
the United States took place where he attended an American Federation o t  
Labor convention. 121 Schumacher spent three weeks in the United States. 
However, hie contacts were virtually limited to labor leaders. His 
appointment book showed n11111erous meetings with Irvin Brown, a trade 
union l eader, and Jay IA:>vestone, a former executive of the American 
Communist Party. He did not get the opportunity to meet with government 
officials. As a result, his impression of the American government 
122 remained suspicious and hostile, and, it must be admitted, vice versa. 
The SPD had some support among American labor organizations. U . A. w. 
President, Walter Reuther, had criticised United States policy as 
returning to power the very people who had helped bring about the war. 
He said American policy in Germany wa s a "threat to democracy in 
Germany and democracy in the world. "123 This was a point which Schumacher 
had been raising tor almost two years. 
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The latter part of 1947 was fairly uneventful for official 
relations between the Unit.ad States and the SPD. However, Delbert 
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Clark of the !!!!! !.2!!, Times stirred up a storm when he accused 
Schumacher of calling tor the partition of Germany, with the westem 
portion then to sign a separate peace . Thi s  'Wt:>Uld have been a sharp 
reversal in SchW11acher ' s  program, since he had always advocated unity 
and nationaliSJ11. So much so, in fact, that one American official had 
called his program "no national socialism but social nationalism. " 
Clarlc, who said that Schumacher was an expert at shifting with the 
political winds, claimed the change in policy came about as a result or 
coni'erences Schumacher had held vi th American officials on his recent 
124 trip, and his desire to be the first chancellor of the "Fourth Reich. 11 
The controversy raged f'or several weeks .  I t  :finally c ame to an 
end when Schumacher replied 1n a letter to the editor of the Times. He 
declared that Clark ' s  original article had been completely wrong. He 
said there had been no secret ••ting of SPD leaders for him to 
institute this "change " in policy, only the regular me ting of the 
Berlin district committe . In that meeting he claimed he took the same 
stand as always, th41t was !or a united Germany and against separation. 
He also stated he was againat a separate peace . Final].y1 as to the 
charge that he had shifted his position tor a political gain, Sch1.111acher 
maintained that he had always been criticised in the past for not 
shifting gracefully with the winds of politic al fortune.125 
l�.Y. T. , November 6, 1947, P •  
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1947 ended on the ominous note of the failure of the London 
Foreign Minister ' s Conference to achieve any sub stantial results 
regarding Germany. The talk of partition became more frequent. Some 
Americans, su ch a s  John Foster Dulles, hoped it would come soon. Some 
sources reported that the SPD and the CDU were already working on a 
joint political proposal to submit to bizonal otticial s as a charter 
for a West German government. Clay was reported to be expec ting the 
document before the end of December. 126 
48 
Schumacher opened the new 1ear by once again condemning American 
and British occupation .forces for no t  granting additional powers to 
Germany. He told a crowd at Munich that decisions for communism or 
democracy in Germ&niY would be "decided with bread. " He claimed that the 
German people would become friends of the country that treated them 
best. He believed that the Marshall Plan would increase the German food 
supply, but the Germana also needed the right to institute demo cracy 
tor themselves. He felt this would be accomplished if the Allies would 
reduce their function to only the lowest level of control. · Schumacher 
closed by attacking wealthJ Germans who he accused of not carrying their 
share of the load.127 
Meanwhile, the United States, realizing that cooperation with 
the Russians over Germany was now probably impossible, began to push for 
the organization of a West German government. There was still a conflict 
between the SPD, l4'lich favored a weakened position of the Laenderrat, 
12�.Y. T. ,  Dece111ber 10, 1947, P •  2.  
127rbid. , J anuary 10, 1948, P• 7. 
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and the center parties, which wanted to have strong federal states.128 
The .Americans and British, however, were trJring to settJ.e differences 
between the parties in order to promote their policies. To do this, 
they agreed to push the public ownership question to the background, 
since it was the main issue separating t.he SPD .from the cru. 129 
In February 1948, the SPD protested to American officials the 
planned visit of Dr. Rudolph Mueller, German economist and political 
figure, to the United States. Mueller had stated that American dollar 
credits to Europe would only prop up socialist governments unless the 
aid was given directly to private agencies. The SPD told American 
officials that what Mueller would say in the United States would only 
pla;y into communist hands, since he wa s a prime example of "ruthless 
private capitalism. "130 
The SPD continued to retuse to meekly follow Allied policy. It 
became a "wedge" in the "cooperative spirit" that the United States was 
trying to promote. In ?-'.arch it had ref'used to accept governmental 
responsibility when the CDU-FDP coalition in the Bizonal Economic 
Council broke up. The SPD said it did not feel it could maintain center 
party support and vowed to wage aggressive oppo sition if the cw remained 
in power.13l In May the SPD once again stepped on the toes or the 
126Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, January .301 1948, 
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.Americans by joining with the KPD to vote down a price increase 
measure, supported by the United States.132 
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Clay remained consistent with hi s  previous actions, in that same 
month. On May 26, the He ssian Landty passed its "works council law" 
and submitted it to O!-.OUS for approval. Clat was busy at that ti.Ille 
with the decisions of the London Conference, currency re.tom, and the 
growing Berlin crisis. He wanted to disapprove the whole act, while 
Robert Murphy believed it should be approved. Clay finally decided to 
accept the "personnel and weU'are" provisions but suspended the 
"economic co-detennination" provisions, because they " affected the 
commerce between st.ates. " Once again Clay had used this technicalit7 
to limit the power of the SPD and hind.er its plans for socialization.133 
Nearly tw years had passed since a,mes •  speech at Stuttgart. 
In this p eriod the United States, as p ersonii'ied by General Clq, and 
the SPD had become open antagonists. In June of 1948 the SPD stood 
openly tor a major program or socialization. It wanted a strong central 
German government which would be able to effectively deal with what the 
SPD saw as Germany • s major problems. Finally, the SPD did no t  desire 
to be a pawn ot either the West or East but wished to pursue an 
independent course in foreign polic1. The United States, on the other 
hand, championed the free enterprise 57stem coupled with federalism, 
which it believed would provide Gemany with the same benefits these 
systems had brought to America. OMGUS alao hoped to integrate a .f ederallzed 
West Germany into a system to contain Soviet expansion. 
l32N.Y. T. , May 27, 1948, P •  11. 
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Wi th  such opposing viewpoints, further conflict between the 
SPD and OMGUS seemed inevitable. The London Six Power Conference, 
which had bee.."1 meeting thro ughout much of the Spring of 1948, was about 
to m ak e  recommendations which would place the ho stility between the 
SPD and the United States in a new arena. The political battle to be 
joined wa s the debate over the founding of a new west Gennan State. 
CHAPTSi1 V 
THE UNIT:D ST.AT.ES, THE SPD, AlID THE 1."0UNDING OF THE 
WEST GERYLJ s·rATE 
The London Conference on Germany was based on the concept that, 
since coop eration with the Soviet Union over Germany was unlikely, the 
Western powers had to m ake some definite pl ans for Germany ' s  future. The 
final deci sion of the conference, which was forwarded to the Nili tary 
Governors and passed along to the Germans on July 11  1948, called for the 
establishment of a federal system of states in the western part o f  
Germany. The document paid lip service to the hope for eventu al German 
unific ation when it referred to the situation in Germany a s  11at present 
disrupted. 11 The German Minister Presidents were instructed to convene a 
11 constituent as sembly " which would adopt a demo cratic constitution fo r the 
p articip ating states. If the constitu tion contained " adequate authority" 
and guaranteed individual rights and freedoms , the Military Governors 
would au tho rize it for ratification. If two-thirds of the states approved 
it, it would become binding. 134 
This document seems to provide adequate leeway for the Germans 
to have a large voice in determining their own future. However, as 
events revealed, whenever it was the independent ideas of the SPD the 
Germans wanted, the United States tried to limit their voice. 
l.34Richard Sc ammon, 11?o1 it:Lc a1 P �rti es , 11 in Govern in££ Po st-War 
Germany, Vol. II, ed. by ;;;dward Li�chfield ( ?ort Washing ton, New iork:  
K ennikat Press, 1972 ) ,  p .  51.J.2 . 
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It was no secret that the West was going to pu sh for a sep arate 
German state made up of its Zones.  Nearly a month before the call for 
a constituent assembly was made, the SPD and the CW were voicing a lack 
of desire to assume the responsibility tor its formation. Both Schumacher 
and Adenauei'f' tel t that the pol1 tician who accepted even a temporary 
division of Germany would be hurting himself and his party for the 
future . As long as there was a chance remaining for a unified Gennany, 
they wanted no part of a western state.135 
Events were soon to change the German intransigence. On June 28, 
1948 , the Soviet Union implemented a land and water block-1e of Berlin. 
The Cold War was in danger of becoming hot. Any hope for a united 
Germarl3 in the near future seemed out of the question. 
By the .fir st of July, it was reported that the German p arties 
were ready to accept a West German state. However, they tried to maintain 
the appearance of not fostering sep aration. The SPD met and agreed to 
demand a change in any occupation statute presented by the Allies which 
did no t  proVide tor complete Gennan control over foreign and commercia1 
relations. Clay responded that the Allies would not promise llll.Y changed 
! priori. The SPD also said that the constituent assembly should adopt 
an " administrative instrument, not a constitution , which implied a split 
in the country which the SPD could no t  accept. ,,l)6 
These propo sals came out of a meeting at Frankfurt at which both 
the S?D and CDU had attempted to decide on instructions tor the Minister 
Presidents .tor their forthcoming meeting at Koblenz. Source s w1 thin the 
parties reported that agreements were easily reachable on some issues, 
J.JSN . Y. T. ,  J une 5 ,  1948, P •  6. 
l36:rbid. , July B, 1948, P •  8. 
-
* Konrad Adenauer wa s the leader of the CDU . 
54 
such a s  a federal state , civil rights gu arantees, a nd the powers of a 
supreme court. However, there were differences over the relative powers 
of the central and Laender governments, and over proportional representation 
versus single constituency representation. The SPD wanted to deal with 
far reaching matters, while the COO wanted to deal with only the basics, 
and trust the rest to the Allies. Both parties exhibited a desire to 
accept sovereignty, which they felt could solve many of Germany• s problems. 
However, they still did no t  want to take the chance o! permanently 
severing the Soviet Zone from their new atate.137 
At a meeting of SPD members, Carlo Schmid, one of Schwnacher•  s chief" 
atdU, declared its main goal was the unification of Germaey. It would 
accep t  a we st German state only a s  a temporary solution. However, as 
stated previously 1 even this would be unacceptable under a draft of the 
occupation statute which gave control over foreign trade and related 
internal policy to the Allies. More moderate party manbers , such as 
Wilhelm Kaisen, believed that Germany should seize every opportunity 
within the Frankfurt proposals to extend its sovereignty. Ou tright 
oppo sition to Allied proposals should be replaced with counter-proposals. 
All factions agreed that whatever document was produced by the Germana, 
it should not be called a constitution. 138 
The SPD was reluctant to support the 1''rankfurt propo sal s in which 
the call for a constituent assembly was included. Murphy believed that 
it was not due to a rear or sanctioning the split of Germany, as the SPD 
137Robert ¥rurphy to the Secretary of State, July 8, 1948, 
FRUS, 1948, Vol.  I I, P• J82.  
lJBRobert Murphy to the Sec retary o f  State, July 9,  1948, 
�. , P• JBJ . 
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claiMd.1 but was a reeult of the laok ot aovereignty, as the SPD aav it, 
granted to 0emany. ll9 'lb• coo, on the other hand, favored fill the 
"positive" aapecta of the proposals. Adcau• stated that the propo•al• 
offered the German people an excellent opport\mitl to shape their own. 
govemment. 140 '!'he SPD and the United. States wve no t drawing flt1Y cloaer 
together, but tbe CW vaa standing right 'b7 the United Statea • aide. 
Ci.roles near to Cla,y pri vatal.7 advised the SPD to accept the 
Frankfurt pmpoaala, beoeu• if they did not,, they would. eventually onl,y 
get leaa. 'fhe SPD was told it was time for '-he Ger.mm parties to 
reoognhe the apli t of <lertna'l1 as a .ta� It waa alao advised to a'ft>id. 
the legal h•gallnl over eovenigntT, a:tnoe wutever they eaU.ed the 
new govemmet document, it vould. be il'anal.ated into ingliah as a 
•conatitution. "141 
Clay •t with the Minister frealdeata of t.he American Zone on 
July 14 and warned tbaa that by del.811nl encl objecting to the F:rank.t\lrt 
p:ropoNJ.a, th81 were btu't1ng tbeir own cav.ee. Olay ""1nded them that 
no matter what "'91 cU.41 they would be accuad of divlding Gemany, eo 
they should 1et about to build •• stana a 1tate ae waa poae:lbl.e with 
the potential tor full economic rctco'tV1• At a later 111Mting the 
Minister Pnaidenta were informed t.hat further poe�n..-ita llight 
require new deciaions bf the .Allied. govel'me\tl and .S.lay' the cauH ot 
0.l'lllal1 self govel'nlNnt. 142 Cl.97 belie'fed the SPD •• reep:maible for 
139.li!S!· 
140rud. , P• 384. 
�d. 
llaaerbert Fe1s, From Tru st to Terror: Th• Oneet of the Cold War, 
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"di stinctJ.y irresponsible "moves on the part of the Germans in cau sing 
the delays, and he felt the SPD was disregarding the seriousness of 
the total European situation.143 
The Minister Presidents and the Military Oovemors met once 
again at Frankfurt on July 26, 1948. The meeting was a long and 
stormy one, which almost broke up several times. It was marked by 
nUlllerous recesses and pauses for discussions among the Military Govemors. 
Finally, the Military Govemors agreed to accept a Grundgesetz, which was 
to be translated as the "Basic Law. " They also a gre d to .forward the 
Minister Presidents recommendations on time schedules and boundary changes 
to their governments. In return, the Minister Presidents would conduct 
the election for the constituent assembly which would draft the Basic 
Law. 
144 
The Germans had littJ..e choice in the sumer of 1948 but to accept 
the Western Allies ' proposals. It was evident that the status quo was 
no t  helping German recovery. By joining with the West, they were at 
least gaining a chance to try something new. The results could hardly 
produce anything worse than they already had. The choice was p articularly 
difficult for the SPD, which still held fast to its policy of' Einheit � 
Freiheit ( Unity and Freedom) and would have preferred to deal with German 
domestic p roblems without interference from East or West. lLS However, as 
Kurt Schumacher had admi tted on several occ asions, for Germ&n¥ the 
"Eastern al ternati ve0 was nonexistent. The SPD co uld sid would deal 
143John Gimbel , _!!!! .American O ccupation, P •  216. 
144 �. , P •  222 . 
lh5Ibid. , P •  224. 
-
57 
with the terms and conditions of Germany ' s  place in Europe, but events 
had made the option for the l'iest unavoidable.146 
Th e  SPD issued its public acceptance o f  the London Conference 
decisions shortly after the meeting at Frankfurt. It declared it was 
accepting them because they were 11 a step forward. n The 3PD claimed 
that, although it had many obj ections,  the We stern propo sal s were better 
than anything offered by the Soviet Union. The SPD wa s not willing to 
p ay  for unity with Germany •  s freedom. 147 The groundwork had been laid. 
It was now time to begin the actual construction o f  the Federal Republic.  
The period from August o f  l9L.8 until Hay o f  1949 saw a tremendous 
number of meetings between Germans , and between Germans and occupation 
officials. The purpo se of the meeting s was, of course, to formulate a 
new German government. During this period, the SPD continued to 
follow a policy more independent from American control than did the 
other p arties, and this naturally resulted in continued oppo sition 
from the United States. 
A preparatory constitutional committee, appointed by the �1in1ster 
Presidents , met in mid-August to finalize plans for the constituent 
assembly. Robert :!-Iurphy reported that the United States, and the o ther 
powers, were maintaining a ''hands offll attitude toward the 'WO rk  of the 
148 committee, and trying not to emphasize the importance of its task. 
On September, 1948, the Parliamentary Counc il, as the constituent 
as sembly wa s called, opened its meetings at Bonn. There were sixty-five 
146 John l{axwell , Social Democrac;y:, P• 272. 
147N .  Y. -1'. , Augu st 1, 1948, P •  5 .  
14BRobert Hurphy to the Secre tary o f  State, August 1 3 ,  1948, 
�.t 1948, Vol . I I, P •  414. 
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fairly evenly divided, w1 th the SPD and CDU each having twenty-seven members. 
The council cal ed for the 11 rebirth11 of Germany under the banner of 
n.rreedom, law, and peace . " The Parliamentary Council overwhelmingly 
approved the seating of .five delegates from blockaded We st Berlin, in 
an advisory role. Thi s  move was promptly followed by a protest from the 
KPD, which condemned the Council for splitting Germany.149 This act 
seemed only to further emphasize the necessity of the Council t s  task. 
The future political diVi siona 'Which would exist in the Federal 
Republic cropPed up shortly after the Parliamentary Council convened. 
One of the first issues which brought the SPD and the CDU into confrontation 
was the issue of representation in the second house of the federal 
p arliament. The SPD was supporting a plan for a "refined form" of 
proportional representation, while the conservatives were backing a plan 
which called for a single constituency majority vote.15° OMGUS had 
no official comment on this controversy, but it is interesting to note 
that a group of United States senators, including J. William Fulbright, 
which was touring Germany voiced oppo sition to the concept of proportional 
representation. Fulbright believed that proportional representation would 
cause splinter groups and l«>uld play into the communist • s hands. He 
recommended that Robert .La.Follette assist the Germans in drafting their 
constitution.l5l 
149Robert Hurphy to the Secretary of State, September l ,  1948, 
�. , P •  415. 
l.SORobert Murphy to the Secretary of State,  September 23, 1948, 
�. , P •  424. 
l5libid. , P •  426. 
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Adenauer had to report to Robert Murphy in November that the 
prime obstacle to the early formation of a German govemment wa s the 
inability of his party to reconcile its views with those 0£ the SPD.152 
As i f  to emphasi ze his point, the SPD promptly led the vote against 
electing a Bunde!Prasident before the unification of all Germany. 
The SPD mo tion also criticised allied interference and said the 
Parliamentar:r Council would carry out its work as mandated by the German 
153 people. 
In December, Carlo Schmid, a leading SPD member in the Council, 
told Murphy that the pril!Jary concern of hi s party was how much control 
the o ccupying powers would maintain below the federal level. Schmid 
wamed Murphy that if the West really wanted a demo cratic Germany, it 
would have to cease interfering at all levels and in all fields as it 
had been doing.154 Schmid revealed one or the main reasons for the 
SPD ' s oppo sition to federaliBDI when he s aid, 1•Wb.ile federalism all over 
the world implies the uniting of what was separated, it i s  apparently 
intended in our case to separate what had already been united. • • •  "155 
This difference of opinion over the meaning or "federalismtt would be a 
problem throughout the negotiations f'or the Basic Law. 
The SPD 1 s desire for independence antagonized American officials. 
In February, one OMGUS official was quoted as saying, "Lf nationaliSlll 
continued to grow, it is po ssible that the Social Democrats 111ay espouse 
152. t�emorandum o f a meeting with Konrad Adenauer by Robert Murphy, 
November 241 1948, !lli• 1  P• 424. 
l.$)Robert Murphy to the Secretary of Sta te, November 231 1948, 
!lli•1 p. L47. 
l54Robert Hurphy to Hi cks, December 18 , 1948, �. , P •  663. 
155 John Golay, � Founding of � Federal ;tepublic 2.f Germany 
( Chicago :  The University o f  Chicago-Press, 1948) , p .  42. 
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it a s  a means to COI!tplete power in the propo sed Western German state 
instead of forming a government in coali ti.on with the Christian Democrats. 
Then you would have socialist nationalism instead of national so cialism. 11 
A second official wa s quick to jump onto this train of thought and 
COIT\'.> ared SPD 0extra party" organizations to groups which the Nazis had 
uaed. J.S6 
The three .Military Governors considered a draft of a Basic Law 
on February 16, 1949 . Clay s tates tha t  there was general approval of the 
document, but he was still concerned that it provided too much central 
government and did no t  distinguish clearly enough between the powers and 
responsibilities of the Laender and those of the federal government. He 
asked for time to 1'urther consider 1t.l57 One should no te that the 
points to w hich Clay objected were precisely the ones the SPD supported. 
Cl ay believed that the federal gove:mment was given too ?lJUch 
power in the draft 0£ the Basic Law over public health, welfare, labor, 
and the press, which had been specifically excluded by the London Conference . 
Clay wa s  also particularly disturbed over what he viewed a s  excessive 
revenue raising powers given to the federal government$ which he believed 
would de stroy the independence of the states. 158 
This last concept caused considerable dissension among the 
Military Governors. Finally, Clay was able to attain a compromi se which 
allowed the !ederal government considerable powers, but al so le.ft 
l56rJ.Y. T. , February 16, 1949, P •  7.  
l571ucius D.  Clay, Decision .!!!, Germ8!1Y ( Garden City, New York: 




suffici ent tax powers to the Laender so as to provide their financial 
independence. The federal government would only be allowed to legislate 
in matters which affected two or more states. This p roposal was presented 
to the Parliamentary Council for its acceptance.159 
Schumacher opposed Clay •  s compromi se propo sal to t he P arl iamentary 
Council. The reason for his oppo sition was not only the lessening of the 
federal government ' s  financial powers, it was also " a  question of all the 
things a sta te needs first in order to become a real state. 11 He said 
the CDU was willing to compromise with Clay on the proposals, bec ause 
it wanted a loo se confederation of German states, "not a viable :·lest 
Germany. " He accused the COO of pandering to French interests in an 
attempt to follow its tttraditional politics of clerical particularism. "160 
The P arliamentary Council took the p ropo sal under consideration, 
but the revised Basic Law draft which it later submitted still did not 
reduce the central govern.�ent• s powers over financial matters enough to 
suit Clay. The Germans were informed that the amendments did not meet 
the spirit of Cl ay ' s  propo sals, and they were asked to reconsider. Clay 
blamed the intransigence of the SPD for the failure to achieve an agreement. 
The SPD wanted to submit the draft of the Basd.c Law to a plenary session 
without American approval. The CDU would not agree to this, and said 
a comp romise was necessary. This put moves toward a govern.�ent at a 
standstili.161 
159 
�. 1 P •  422 .  
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The Allied Foreign Ministers, meeting at Washington in April of 
1949 , attempted to overcome the deadlock by info rming the P arliamentary 
Council ,  via the Military Governo rs , that they hoped the Parliamentary 
Council l«:> uld so n adopt a Basic Law in the London spirit. The foreign 
ministers transmitted another letter to the Council which stated that the 
West German govemment should be given liberty of action in administrative 
and legi slative matters, except in a few reserved fields. They also 
transmitted a brief, two and one-half page occupation statute for the 
council ' s  approval. Clay believed this was a great document which 
provided the German government all the powers 1 t needed, a s  far as he 
162 was concemed, to lead a viable state. 
On April 20, the SPD met in its annual party congress. The 
major topic of discussion was naturally the Basic Law. Schumacher had 
publicly announced hie intent to resist the changes in the Basic Law 
as advocated by the Military Governors and to support its adoption 
wit.bout any amendments. Clay believed. SchUI11acher wanted increased 
centralized control in order to more ea sU, �lernent socialization 
measures af'ter the government was formed. Ir Schumacher could successfully 
defy the Allies in the matter of the Basic Law, Clay feared he could ride 
to victory at the polls as the "de.render of the German people against the 
Allies. 0163 
Clay wanted to determine j ust how committed American policy was 
to a decentralized Gen an government, so he contacted his superiors in 
Washington. He received word that the United States was interested in 
162 4 8 Ibid. , P •  2 • 
-
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the prompt formation o f  a We st German government, hopefully without much 
sacrifice of federalized structure. The secret negotiations being carried 
on with the Ru ssians in Berlin were the c ause of the United States ' desire 
for a prompt agreement in Bonn. 164 
The foreign ministers in Washington had written a second no te for 
transmis sion to the Parliamentary Council ·whenever the ?··lilitary Governors 
deemed it appropriate. The l etter had given in somewhat to the Gennan 
po sition on financial powers for the central government. However, Clay 
was unwilling to forward the vote to the Council, because it wo uld app ear 
as a moral victory for Schumacher. He denied that the .American policy 
of "neutrality" had changed,, bu t 11in this instance the CDU favored federal 
government, which was also Tripartite policy. 1116
5 
Much to his surprise,, Clay was instructed to forward the letter. 
He warned Washington that it would lead Schuroaeher to conduct a campaign 
on an anti-occupation platform. Clay did not want thi s  bec au se it might 
fo reseeably lead to an SPD Victory. However, he was able to circumvent 
the effect of the order, by waiting till afte.r the SPD congress to forward 
it. Clay achieved his desired results. Although Schumacher received 
strong personal support from the SPD congres s, its final declaration 
called for di scussions to negotiate a."llendments to the Basic Law; when 
Clay finally transmitted the l etter on April 23 , the parties were already 
negotiating, and the letter lost much of its political impact.166 This 
affair was but ano ther example in a long line of Clay ' s  intervention. 
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On April 24, the SPD and the CDU reached, in principle; a 
compromi se on the Basic Law. They planned to submit it to the Military 
Governors at Frankfurt the next day. The qu estion was whether or not it 
would be accepted. Ir it were, only ratification and plenary sessions 
would be necessary before the birth of a new German state.167 
Clay wa s the spokesman for the l'fldli tar1 Govemors at the meeting 
on April 25. He reiterated to the Gennans that he and his colleagues 
were still di ssatisfied with the broad powers the Basic Law granted to the 
.federal government in legal and financial matters. However, the Germans, 
after di scussion, were unwilling to make further changes. This left 
Clay in a difficult po sition. He believed the ex.tent of federalization 
was in hi s hands, because the French had agreed to accept whatever he 
might decide. He told the Germans that he wa s trying to meet the foreign 
ministers ' instructions as well as meet the Germans ' viewpoint. If an 
agreement were no t reached soon, the Military Govemors would be forced 
to go back to their governments tor more instructions. Clay then 
offered a compromise which would allow the federal government to raise 
taxes for education, heal.th, and welfare , and to make grants to those 
states which could no t  do it themselves. The Germans .finally agreed to 
this compromise , and the major obstacle to acceptance of the Basic Law was 
eliminated. 168 
On May 8,  1949, the M:ilitarJ Governors approved, with reservations, 
the Basic Law !or Germany, and the Federal Republic was bom. One might 
think that, as far as the United States was concerned, fu ture Germai 
167N . Y. T. , April 251 1949, P •  7 .  
168tucius Clay, Decision ..!!! Germany, P •  433. 
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internal political matters wo uld not be a subject for American policy. 
B.owever, this was not to be the case. 
Clay viewed the founding of the Federal Republic as the culmination 
of his work in Gennany, and he viewed Schumacher, who oppo sed Clay ' s plans 
for West Germany, as unfit to become its leader.169 Even after Clay' s 
departure in mid-May, his successors continued to distrust the 
"authoritarian" and 11nationalistic 11 character of the SPD . To American 
occupation officials Schumacher ' s behavior was "irrational, parochial , 
and increasingly threatening to United States ' obj ectives in Germany. " 
Up until the ".Jest German national elections, the United States believed 
it was necessary to frustrate the SPD'  s drive for power, if American 
170 intere sts were to be pro tected. 
Schumacher ' s  main theme in the election campaign during the summer 
of 1949 wa1 the failure of the policies of the Economic Council, controlled 
by the CDU, which he claimed had caused l. J million unemployed, high 
171 prices , low wages, and had only contributed to the wealth of the wealthy. 
Unfortunately for Schumacher and the SPD, the issue was not strong enough. 
The August l4 elections showed the CDU winning 7, 357,579 vo tes to 
61932, 272 for the SPD. This was translated into an eight seat advantage 
for the CDU in the Bundesta�, 139 to lJl. The balance of power would be 
held by the other smaller parties. 172 
169tewis Edinger, � Schumacher, p. 186. 
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American officials anno unced the United State s would give strong 
support to the new conservative government which they hoped would be 
formed as a result of the elections. They were satisfied that the CDU 
victory was a Victory for a republic which would become a strong ally of 
the "democratic powers" in the struggle for Zurop e. Officials believed a 
coalition between the G DU and FDP would be much easier to deal wi th  than 
the SPD, and a government based on free enterprise would arouse much 
more sympathy in the United States than one based on socialism.173 
Newsweek Magazine reported that the government resulting from 
the general elections would be on the side of political conservatism 
and economic liberalism. The magazine claimed that .!;:!! enterprise 
had " sparked Gennany • s remarkable economic recovery" and the CDU victory 
seemed to off er mo r e  progress for Germany, plus a government which 
the United States would find more to its liking than one dominated by the 
SPD. 174 � echoed this same feeling, stating that .American occupation 
o fficials were pleased with the election results and hoped Adenauer and 
175 the CDU would be successful in governing Germany. 
Fortune Magazine, a ttcheerleader" for the American free enterprise 
system, was exuberant in its praise of the election results. It claimed 
that all that the German people had given up by rej ecting the SPD was 
"central planning" at home combined 'With "rampant nationalism. n J.<"ortune 
believed that the increa sed innuence of the Catholic Church, which would 
l7.3Ibid. 
l7�ewsweek, August 22 , 1949 ,  P •  29 .  
175�, August 221 1949 , P •  18 . 
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be one result of the C:JU victory,, would be a stabilizing in.fluence on 
Germany, and th., economic policies of the CDU, formulated in large part 
by econo.u st Ludvig Erhard, would bring continued 'Jerman prosperlty. 176 
The liberal publication, The Nation, deplored the cw victor,y. 
It believed the conaervative victory would eventually brtng about a 
resurgence of mili t..ant nationaliS?ll of Nazi variety and. blamed the 
United Sta tes tor this on account of the preference it had shown toward 
tbe Geman right throughout the occupation. ,!h! N�tign believed that the 
CI1J "R>uld eventually 1ose popularity tor its "collaboration" with the 
the SPD t!light ult:L"llatel.y benelit by putting in a ;rear or twt> in 
opposit:ion.177 
The ott1c1al CMJUS weekly news bulletin heralded the victory ot 
the CDU in the national elections as a victory for • tree economy. The 
l'e00ff1'7 of the Gema."1 ecol'lOllJY waa credited. to the p0liciea of C:JU/CSU 
economist Ludwig Erhard and its election reault.a were viewed by OMQUS 
a s  a Vindication of Erhard ' a policies by the Geman people. It wu 
believed that the 10cialization qlle$tion WQUld. die down a1 a result ot 
the outcome of the el.ection.178 
The SPD had hint.ad that it would be willing to participate in a 
"greet coalition, " it it were given the Ministry or Econoldca and al.la-ad 
to implement its socialist program, but Schmacher kept waiting for 
Adanauer to make the first lltOVe. When the two f1nall1 did "°et on 
176:.ortune Magazine, October, 1949, P •  72. 
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September 10, it was for Adenauer to announce hi s  support or Theodor 
Heuss, a member of the Free Democratic Party, for Federal President. 
Schumacher later stated that economic di.:f'ferenoes had prevented a 
coalition, but one might have been po ssible if a moderate o r  left wing 
CDU mmber had been in control of the party.179 
Schumacher then made it clear that if the center-right hoped to 
govern , it would have to find majorities on every issue . The first 
test came on the vote .for Federal President. Schwaachar was the 
candidate of the SPD for the po st, and the Bundesta& had to vote on th& 
question twice before Heuss .finally received a majority. lleuss then 
promptly nominated Adenauer for the po st of Chancel,l.or of the Federal 
Republic. Schumacher wa s once again the alternative candidate. On 
September 15, 1949, Konrad Adenauer won the po st by the slimmest 
po ssible majority, 202 votes to 201.180 One vote had thus insured the 
continuation of American supported policy in the new We st German state. 
The American system of federalism and private enterprise was to have 
the chance to solve the problems of post-war Germany, not the SPD. 
l79John Maxwell, Social Democracy, p. 281. 
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John loner Dull•, who eer'V'ed •• a toHtp poliv adYiaor to 
HTCll"el adllin1.Wa'1ona, oppoeecl t.w ot the SP.01 s Mjor ..... ru-.t, 
Dul.lea vas i11*1l'l•t eoci.Uh\ion1 whi&h he el.aimed eald. deatl'OJ 
OeNmT' a -.tab11itr. He belieTed aooiaU&eti.on � "inaulation• 
'ltd.cm could al t1Mtel.1 pr.mint the tmU;1 ot W.stem Bmrope.181 Seoondl.1, 
Dull.es wa not in favor of tM SPD' a drive tor a Mntral.Ued German 1tate. 
He bel1ued that 11cteoentral.i1ation" offered \be aolaUon t.o the ttaerun 
Problem, • an4 be celled tor the Lf!'IMls to 11:.., a "large •MW:'e ot 
18l.4o1m J'ollter J>ulln, !S: ,u P9ace (lw rows Maoaillan eel 




political. autonony. n D\lll.es declared that the t1n.1kcl States •• in taie 
pold.tion of ·J)O'tfel' 1n \feetem o......,. and lt ldlOuld illpo• a ayatem ot 
tedera11-. l8a 
Aa lHfltioned. prev.2.oual.1', Bobart Murphy, who wae the lilll.aon bet.Mn 
CHJtJS and the State DepU"tllent, was agatrin 1tte SPD• e plans trw eooiaUuM.on 
:1n Otnaany. In t� he had onoe ealltd a. � am. ot Coetlpati.on 
• "oapi tali.et o•IWi• 1tl a eoc1&1.1at desert. -183 
George r. lane, the heed ot the PoU.07 Pl.amd.ng Di"fiaion vi th1n 
t.he state DepU'tlltct, 'bu4'd. Ida hopes tor aum.,• • f\l1m'e upon a ww_ 
tederal 1arope, et wtd.a • om.ted o.i.....r would 'be •  utearal pan. 
However, for o.m.;, 1lo 1*'1ome • w'bel' ot thi• new eV.t\Ue ab.fl would 
need to ttvidan h8l' hori.Mu• � lW'ft1r lincu1atic ed. nationtl Umita.184 
WhUe l,emm• a  poaltd.on ••• not d.Ueot:b' oppoMCl to \b.e SPD, it did 
oont.lict nth Sob18Mhu1 • deai1"9 t.o Hbuil.cl � into a atrong 
naUonal na\e betor• di••atna f eclenU• tor lbrope. 
saom.17 ot St.te Dten Aoheaoa, wm had oa'U.ed th• Geman nft1.onal 
electtone in vb1ob tee cm o'b� a plar.Utf' a "Tictory fer moderation 
encl oomon aense, .W was �  ou'8poke 1n b.1a cl"iticlslll or the SPD 
Ind its leader, Kun hbumaob.er. In his llell!Oil'e he baa deaonbed his ftrn 
meetings with Manaur and Schumacher. B4t Wl'Oie tha.t he ••• struck by tM 
l82John Foster .Dullea, "luop• Must hderlte or Pena,. • 
Vlffl "'9!m .!£ !.!!! Bit. XllI (Fel>rt18J7 11 1947)1 t)6. 
183-ot:tat M'urpby, Jt.'ls!m::es& 111£!19£! (GaNen CU:q, ·- Yens 
Dotableda7 aild Conlp..,, lt6k , P• J2(J. 
181&.aeorce 1. lennan., �fl 622S:\!1Q ( Boston.a Little, Btovn 
and Co•&nJ), P• !&17. 
lS.Sstatem$nt b.r Secretary of State Acheson, August 16,. 1949, 
u.s. Department ot State, � M>�* � � in �;;eni! 
(Wubington, n. c. 1 u.s. O vernmentg o?Hce;-IJ;OT, p�IS. 
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"im� er1.d w:Lsdo•• ; ot Adenauer• s approach, tdd.oh held the integraUA:m 
ot � :Into Western IltNpe above arq plans tor re-unification • 
.Adenmer• s wordt g•ire Aohe11JOn •hope tor a new dq 1n Jturope. wl86 
Contrast the above opinion of .&ttenauer with Ach•IOft' • .tirei 
1-pression ot �. whom he called •hershl.y nationalistic and 
aggressive. • Schumacher• •  attack on Adenauer for working with. the 
oooupa'1oa vaa viewe4 vi th diapa\ b7 Achemn. He accused the SPD 
ot •cuft7ing f8't'Gr" vlth the Buuian  end "1le wt.n by •baiting the 
occupation. • Die W•tern Powers had ••rificed too auoh, ecco:rd.1ng to 
Acheeon, t;o be pl.,-.d. ott 11a1net the lusld..,,. 1'>7 the Oel'JWla.187 
Seoreta7 ot Detanae J' ... FornaW. decried. what be believed 
were Britiah att.pte to pl.'Omote socialia in Biaord.a. le felt that the 
eatabli� ot the 11.IOUl !oonom1c Council, in w.bich tha SPD held a 
•'1ori'1'1 could lead to eooiaU.satton. �•\11 auellted that ti18 
i.r1tiah ahotll.d he tolcl that thq ld.&ht lose Meri.can economic aid it thel' 
paabecl too bard tor IOGi.U.S•'tllon. Jbnntal stated that "w did no" 
propoae to Aav9 "" llOM7 uaed to 1mpl_.t a a...... qst.- aonV.17 to 
our om ideaa. •188 
In �·• then was little sptJC1t1c d1-.s•on ot the SPD, bu� 
there vaa one eorud.atent voice ot oppoai t1on towal"d the Genan socialiata. 
Thia was Conifts811erl John Sadoweki ot MloM.aan, the l'flprttaentati. ve ot a 
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predom:1Mn\11 Polish district. 1.n Jttlt, 1941,. Sadowaki condel!D.ed 
SChumacher as a danger to the United States' plane tor a demooratie 
�. He called Sohma eh r a "Pan-Oe1'1111111r and a fanatic whc> acted a  
U Garmany were "an innocent 'ri.r&in. " Sadoweki olailted that there wa 
always a Oemm leadeJ! who was readl' to remrt to brutal aggruaion. 
'l'here bad bem �ok the Great., B:l.aa:rek, t.he Kaiser, Hitler, •ma 
1'01' Sohumaob� 1 • who Sedowek1 said would bear watohi.ng. le closed hie 
condannaiion of the SPD by calling to-z a 001111.d:tie• iftveatigatlon to -*• 
certain Germany' 1 war potential had been oo.ple'telf des� 189 
This concem. ovw th• SPD was :indicated. on th• other sicle of 
Capitol Hill b7 the acMone or Republioe S..tors Ball, Knowland, and 
Ferguson, who demam4'd that CHIUS preaerve a •beaobbead ot private 
enterprlae• in Wutem Gcmn.tn.y. This "'*'*• 11hich c.. in Deoamber of 
1947 during an Appl'Dpri•tii.ons Oomnd.ttM � on tbe Analo-Amerl.can 
agreamct on bieonal. eoonolld.ea and i'inlflCft, was the reeult of a fear thlt 
h e�, with the Jritiilb b.tokin&, would be able to block American 
•-• to re-eetablleh tn4t enterpr:Lae in the ooabined sous. SecretQ7 
ot the knfr Willi• Draper u&recl the oOJld.�tee that the United Statee 
110uld never allow Roh a thing to h-- unleaa the Gtmlan people had 
decided tor 1t democra�oaUT.uo 
OUMide QDVenmtent eirol•• in the United Ste• tnere ••• al• 
strong opposition to the sPD. B'.al"l Brm.d.t, a a.me born eoortollliat 
Who had aerwd 1n Geman,r vJ.th OKGUSt voiced bia 4ifaptHMD\ with the 
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SPD' a socialistic objeet.ivea. Brandt raaintained. that 1t the German 
econon17 waa to be aal vaged at all, the "d1•redi wn toaoept ot a 
collective eoonomy had 1ro be aban.6oned, and he crlti.oiaed the Military 
GoYel'llDent fol" not eliminatS.ng al  tons of colleetivism.l.91 
Both Bobet Moses •n<l J. P .  Warbfuos wn conoemEKI witb socialilatton 
measures in the .ltuhr. >b us. who had don-e a study in the area tor Gmeral 
Clay, opposed British attempts to promote social1aat1on in the Ruhr ed. 
declared that the United States should. maintain a strong preHnce in 
Gerllarll" to proD101le its 1nteresta.1'2 Warbu1ir. an economist, did not 
believe either sociall• or free en:terprl..• tft)llld pro'ride th• solution 
tor the Ruhr. Be calltd fo:r a "Ru.hr Coal Autborit;r, st similar to the !VA 
in the United Statee, to be Gre•ted t.o allocate ooal to lurope, and tbaa 
end the q,oesti.on of $0cialisation fo:r the Ruhr. l9) 
Hiatol'ian re1u · Hirsch criticiaed both th• SPD and the coo tor 
ttpract.tcinc polities aa usual, • which he claime<l had helped wreck Wad.mar. 
The epeeifie instance to 'llhioh Hinch re.tarred waa the SPD• s vi thdrwtl 
into oppoaition .rter tbe COO had prevented it .t'rom attaining the 
DiNOtcrate of lcenomica in the BS.son.al �Jltio Council. to Hirsch, who 
'belieTed p&rt;r cooperation was e1Mnt1a1 tor the At� ot Qemen;y, auch 
political behavior wae not an enaouraging aipi.,Uk 
· 191.tari Brandt, "la there Still a Chance tor GentlnTf-.America• • 
Raaponsiblli\V1 " Tbe 5-19 Attai:-e P!EW:t!'tl (H•1'f Regn_,. �1111Yt *1't 
19u8) , P• 23. . 
l�.J,',Tu Sep� 11, 1947.t P •  14. 
l93d. P. Warburg, •Deadlock ovei- o.....,, •  :a.hind. the �· 
VI I (AprU 1$, 191&7) ,  P •  26. 
l9l&r.iu Hirsch, "What Future for Germany, n XIII (October, 1947),  
7k 
Julian Bach, an Amer.I.can joumalist who bed vneled extenaivel.1 
in Germ.tn1'1 did not t1nd the SPD• s desire to itlt>lement aocialiaation 
partioularlt diaturb1ng. Be was more o noerned with the foreign polto.r 
pl'OpOaal.a of the SPD. heh believed that the SPJ>• a remmciation of war 
guilt and the need tor reparat.iena spoke ill tor the future, 11nce the 
conaervat1ve1 would likelf be eTen more oppoaed to then conoepW. Bach 
teared that th• SPD was •t.Jienc enough to ptlt it• Prtlll"lll into praetice.19S 
PO£MM, the AMl'loan bueineas ugu1ne, ••• pleaeed to repon in 
September of 1948 tha\ tbe United St."8 vaa auppo� tr• enterprtse 
in Ge:ma\1, ed., even tbo'2P Bntain waa ttceeed" with sooialism a\ 
holte, 1\ ••• no lonser pu*1ng tor it in o.m-r. lst.£.1!!! believed the\ 
b.-ae aaterpri.ae now bad at 1.ean • •SO-SO• cha\M to be dold.nant in 
Qel"U07.1" 
lfa'°ld 8tae"'1, \Ile Qovemor of Mirmeaiie who was thm a promineftt 
figure on tbe national ln-1  opposed tme aooial.1aa"1cm ot indu stry and 
beli8'f'ed U..t Amer.lean aid to Weetem l\aop• should be granted on the 
eondition that the Brit.tab Oovttft'Dlellt lboal4 re.train boa aupponmg 
.turthv national1sat.1on ot t>Uio indu•tn..a.1'7 
01l8D toag, wbe ia know. prilsu'il.7 for 'the pl• dealing w.l th 
German nparatione bom Wbrld War I whioh beu• hia nlDMI, was another 
atrona opponent ot allowing sooialisa to gnv 1n Geau•DJ'• l'otlng f'Ml'ed 
US.rultan heh, Aaetftg•'I 91p• a as.a• !! !!t 9E!Ra,i&.,_ 
(New torka RCldom Houee, ) , P• • 
19'rad!!e !!IEll· SeJ>tcber, 1948, P• 116. 
1'1x .. nndoa to Cl.ark M. Clittord, October 16, 1947, 1'be Paper• 
ot Clark M. Clifford_. 1'be H81'l7 s .  truman Library. 
that t.be naUonalization of majoio indlaatrias which '111.')Uld be • reault 
� the prognm raponaored bf the SPD ._'11.d place too auch power in the 
hands ot a oentnd Germ• govel'!BMAt. !hie power could, according to 
Young, ul tilut.1¥ be tu.mtMl qalnat tU Wutem Alllaa. Be maintatne4 
that a soc1.Uet4.e go� in a.a_, 11.n1ld. be a ._ater• ot V. 
people and 110uld be Ut\1.e different. f:r.'Qm Gisfitng �st govermqnts.1'8 
A.a one might. apect.. the National Auooia\ion of Collll$1"0e oppoaed 
the objec\ivea of t.be SPD. 'fbie organiaation did not believe that tbe 
United Stawa aboul.4 MD4 loea to European ooun.vtea who proposed 
nationll1Bin1 their indllnrt•. J. S. FUh•, the �hairaan of ttt. 
Association' • Rnional Attain eo.it'- deol.aNd til•t. the Allerioan 
go�t ebould inaia\ tut an aoooan'Uq be .....,ed to ebow that 
•Aaer.toan dollars _.. mot aaain being uud. to advlDoe aocialistio 
prograa • • • • in oount.rie1 aeh u GerraaDJ'. UP 
'lboae indi'fidaal.1 in the Uni.S stt�s 1tbo npporte<l the 
objectiff8 or the SPD toned • •ell JDinoriv. Drew x:t.ddletori of tM 
!!! York !1!!! va• a bighl.J vocal criU.O of Aller.lea pol q toward ibe 
SPD. He ad'WOcatecl .faueri.oan 9Dpp0r\ for llf1' Oeman IO"'e1"Dlllftt Whioh 
upheld ind1Y.ldual fr..._. Middleton bellev9'i iihe United S'8tea shoul.4 
acoept the fact tbat a •dinaateful• aooi.Ust..tc p�t eoul.4 be 
198i..tter trom ORD D. Young to A\V.U Her1Jlan1 September 12, 
1947, Record# of the Pretd.dent1 a Comlt'8e on Pohlp. Aid, !ha 
Ha1T7 s. Truman Libl'G7• 
1"tetter bt>m J. a. '1 aher to Senator Jo..,ta R. McCarthy, 
October ll1 l91'7i .leoerds ot the Pru:ld.ent• a coalttee on Fereign Aid, 
'1'he Harry s. frwlan Libr.,-. 
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ruling Germany BOon. 200 In his opinion, General Glay had a "blind e1pOt" 
when it came to understanding the appeal of the policies of the SPD for 
the German people.201 to Middleton, tbe laisaez ... fa1re eocnomic policiea 
of the CDU ·141::n1ld "shock Republicans 1I1 the United States. u202 
Journalist Dorothy 'l'hompson saw little hope ot the German ecoD0111 
being succesafull,y integrated into the capitalist. world. She claimed 
that the Germane were used to 1 ithighly integrated, state ccntrolled, 
planned economy, which Wtf1'kfd• " and. provided. German wo:rk:ers a high 
standard ot living. She believed the United States would eventuallJr pay 
a la.rge price in. American unemplo11tent if it attempted to force free 
enterprise on Ger.many. 20J 
Both �! Na»gF,t and .The !!! l!ePu\>lie witre s�ng joumalistio 
supporters of the SPD. In February of 191+7 The Nati.cm deolared that the 
most necessary step for a peaeatul and �cratio Germ1n1 wee the 
socialimation ot major indus'llriee. It con<lerr.tned. the American "neutral n 
policy which in realit7 diaooaraged moves 'bovard public ownership. The 
magazine ori ticised the J2!£!!!); !! 99!eeirc•• which had declared tha.t t.he 
United States should prevent nationa11aation. • inc.e 0ermC'l1' could not 
afford to provide sufficient compensation, and voiced the opinion that 
the United States bad not fought a war to reao� Amttrican business trout 
bad. investment.a. 20li 
200nrew M1d.dleton., 1'b,e �trugte fo .. z: Germs (New York: Allan 
Wingate. 1949), P• 282. 
201Ib;id. ' P• 1)6. 
202rud. , P• a. 
203.tetter from Dorothy Thompson to James F. Byrnes, July 16., 1946., 
The Jemes F. B;mes :Pepe.rs, The James F. Bymes ColloctJ.on of the Reibert 
Muldrow Coope� Libt-81'1, Clem$on University, Clemson, South CsroliJ:u!� 
204In! N&iio;, February 8, 194'! 1 P •  26. 
Kurt Schumacher and the SPD received highly favorable treatment 
in !l! !!! Re,.e11blio in March of 1947 • The SPD waa called. a .f'airJ.1 stable 
entity in an unstable s1 tWltion in GeniaDT. Aeoording to 1!!! !!! Rsaubl1o, 
social demoerac1 vould. provide the way to a new democratic Germany. It 
clabJed that the Western world needed "good Germana vhci a.rs at th& sme 
time good in:ternational socialists. ti Schaecher was called the most 
"authentic harbinger ot convalesceneett in post-war Gem�.20S 
In Mrs. Frank:µn :O. Rooseveltt the SPD had an infiuential friend. 
The f omer First La41 viewed the SPD as a vital ingredient tor establishing 
democracy 1n Germany. Sh• believed that a strong democratic labor 
movement in a.rm_, could lead the way to br:inging Gemmy 1n as a full 
partner in the community of free nationa. 206 
The Executive CouncU of the American Federation o! Labor 
supported the Gennan work.ere in the 5PD. In a memorandum to President 
Truman, the Council proposed that the United States adhere to the policy 
that "all nations whom we aid. have the in'Violable right to decide 
democr'41tieally their own. political and. economic relations. " The 
A. F. o:f L. declared this policy should. not applJ' to "totalitarian" 
governments, but aey democratic politic.l end economic philosophy, such 
as that espoused by the SPD, should be acceptable to the United States. 201 
2°''l'h• l]!w Republic, March lO, l.947 1 P• 26. 
�.I.Te , June 3, 19461 P• 8. 
201Memorandum trom the Executive Council of the .American ?ede:ration 
of Labor to President Truman• December 19, l9h7, The Papers of Harr;r s. 
Truman, The Harry s. Truman Library. ( These papers, a s  w�,.u a s  tho se 
previously cited t.rom unpublished collections, were gemirously loaned to 
me by my advisor_. Dr. Wolfgang Schlauch. ) 
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Carl Land••• a tor.mer German "leftist• wriUng in the Jp9rp4 
!?! J:\!Um ti.f!9.!2'a �1-4 the opinioa that d.eecratie social.1• would be 
the strongest .force tor an ethical reconatrtaetdon ot Oermaror. Thie vaa 
a torce that h.C stood •re •tnmal.Y than -.:y other in the recmt past 
tor the •J>rotb.el'bood ot num. • hgardlea• ot it.e eoonend.c Jllled te or 
d.elleri ta, �er 'believecl that aocJ.al daocn07 woald have to plaJ' • 
v.t.tai m• tn GertlanJ•• tu"1N.aoe 
Fred.I Utl.q, following a atudt .the had llade ot th• German 
ai�ation, acwsed the United States of t.17ing to f'OJ"Oe Genm;r, a nation 
w1 th stl'Ong tt'Hitiona and • high level. of oul �, to •coapt Allerlcan 
inetitu.tiona, like the tree ente:rpriM •Y•tem. She believed thie waa an 
impossible tuk, eapeciall.Y linoe the Uld.W States VIS IOina a\toat. it in 
a belligerent, i&noren\1 manner. 209 CKWS • w.a-.t ot the SPD 1• • 
prime exmaple of Miu Utl.91' e t.heaia. 
Ca1'l. E. SOhorske wrote Ql'llP&thetically that the SPD had. becm 
.taoed With "al.most inauperablett pro'bl•• un4u tile occupation. The 
profound hatred of Coamd.a on the part. of the SPD lead.6ra voul4, 
according to Schoran, .toroe th• to maintain a pro-Weetem orientation, 
choosing capit.alist-democray over t.otal1tarien-1C>cial1•• 2l.O Schorake 
criticised the United. Stat.a tar blocld.ng attempts to aocialiu the 
208aar1 wauw, •Tne m1ea and 0el'Mft7' • Future, • J2w;n& st, 
Modem �·tou. XVIII (September, 1946), 26o. ' 
209Freda. Utley, J!!! � £1!! 2£ Y19UE!! (Cld.cagot H81U7 
Itegnery Company, 1949),  P• � 
2lOcari E. Schorllke1 "Th• DUemrua in Gem11m71 • VirmJ;! 
Q!al'terl.z ��ew, mv (Winter, 1948) , J2. 
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Ruhr industrie,s and tor promoting the restoration of the area to ttpriwie 
initiative. .. It vu evident to Schorske that t.he United State&, while 
proclaiming that the qu•stion of aociall.zatic:m would be left up to the 
German P110P1•• was trying to delay the decision until prosper1"1 had bee 
restored and the "entrepeneu.l"Ml class" v:aa aglin doMinant in Geman,y. 211 
Al though there was SOllle support for the goals of the SPD lllOl'll 
"le.ft• leaning indiVidu•l• in the United States, the ntejorU;y ot 
llinfomed• .Auaerioana wen oppose4 to the SPD and 1te objectives. 
Unf'ortunatel.y tar a.man $ocial Demoorac,-. it was the m•bers of this 
majority who were moat able to ...t their 1ntlueno• over .Aaerican 
policy towal'd Gensan.y. 
�!i!&�•t P• 41. 
!he question of whether or not the tlni:ted 8t1k8 intentrionally 
tried to prevsi\ the SPll t.rom aetWn1ng its pal of a aoeiali•t eGOftOJV' 
in a st.rong centralised nattonel state hae 'been debatecl sinee the daJ"• 
of tbe oooupation. 
M8ft1 or the opiniona ?Oiced 1n the l9SO '  a at the height of the 
Cold War claiud theft ••• lit.iile ev.t.dfmoe to ind1oate \hat the United 
Statea opposed th• SPD or aided ita ri '111, Um CW• Hanld Zink, the 
otticial hiatiori.an tor t.he American OCC12pation, wrote that. clfd.me of 
b1aa wre ua&l••ted., and were probabl.7 the l'fuNlt of atateents made 
hter, prior to t.he l9S3 eleottona. It there were Cl1' faw.tritiam shovn, 
Zink bell.,.. 1t ••• bec•UM the coo t� Ammom. plans tor 
1ntearatma GenllDT into � W.stein �--- eOlllltlRiv, whtoh the SP» 
opposed.. 211 
Poli\ioal Mienti•t RS.chuel Sc._. baa reached a similar 
oonclueion. He u1nUiQ \bat Allerioc occupation authorit:lea were, 
on the whole, 6un1nter•eW• 1n poUtiea, ad the MaC\ion they had 
toward Gema political acti..t.tiea vu l•rcelr one of •ap•thT• • Scamaon 
beliftvu that Altericau 1lho � pol114cs at all would have 
tnored tJle cm, wb.ieh, 1n cw.mtran to the SPD, adwo.W tree enterprise, 
2UaaoU Zizdc, Thp !J&, Ja G.!l'MV• P• 3)7 • 
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bot he doe• not � tlleN waa aotive Aller.lean apport tor the coo. 
lowve.r, Soanaon prUfllte no d1.-mable � to• b1a oOJlOluaion.1 
which ia that \he Uni'Md States us neu'1'al. 21) 
J. s. Manin, • .Aaertoa attom.tq who hat! IC"V'ed 'Id Vt OJGUS 
in Oerunr, has taken 1 dltterent Viev regardiq Atnencari 1nvo1Tement. 
He 1a ot the apint.on thet tile pre1«1ce in 1ibe lfili\817 Govurmterl\ ot 
Aaericlfl firllts, Jt.lOh as Oenenl Motors and Republic Steel, whiob had 
adntaine<l p,._,,.r arrangeaunts with such au.a induatrie1 as I.a. Farben, 
bed an etteot upon O!GUS policies. 21h Such un W'Ottld natuNlly be dJt-.. 
tovmi tba CW -1 would have opposed BPD � ob3eot1YU. 
lleMn\ biator:t.an• brft oontdlwec:I tne debate over A111er.l.can 
att.ttuclea tow.rd tba SPD. John Hairell 'bel.1"'" 01q 1'11 srlapioioua ot 
the SP» &4 the •tlvu of �. CQ.q•1 con'd.oUou in f'8'VOr ot 
f'ederal.1• and f:Ne •1Htrpri•• made tt nead.T illpo•lible tor hbJ tio be 
o'theni•• 23$ Llo.14 Gal'dner Min\ain• that aa n.1.ations with the Sorta\ 
Union ware -� IM O'J..,-• 1 .tear• ot So'fiet inlp1red -�-
1.ncreasect, Clay abut ott ...,. lldld. tome ot eoei.U.718'ion in the 
wutem scmae. 1'M 110n the SPD attacked theae policiu, the aore ettorte 
OHH1I dda on �t ol the CW. 21' OU'drter Mlle Uxd.ted Statee polJ.07 
in 0erntln1' one of ".Meri.can counter-?<ew>l.tttion• against., &llOng other 
things, the SPD. ll7 
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John Gimbel oppoaea the tbeo17 that the Amertcan deain to pNmOte 
tree ente:rpriae plf11'14 a p1'01lliner1t role in United States occupation 
poliq in GtmnanJ'• While he admits that there ws anti•a:)(lialist bias 
on the part ot officials Uk• a.tar, he maintain& that aome historians• 
su oh  as G�r, have oveN11phaeiled the etfect ot thia pnjud.iae in 
areas vhe?'e it bad no bealtlng. Gimbel cd.tes the interpfftat!on of 
BJm••� Stattgart .,..m. aa a �  emaple of tbia.a.8 
On the ba ia of Vda m. tar• a re8Ql'Ch• tAte evidence lean• 
11 ttle doubt •• to the nature ot .AJllerican a\t.1 tudee toward the SPD. 
niere was relatiftl.r litG.• apport. tor t.be SPD in. ta. United States. 
Only a tn 1nd1 T.l4ul.e, HIV of th8'I "ht\ v:Ulg• :lnt.el.lectuJ.a, fa'fOred 
the SPD. Howeft\?'1 1b.eH WN not 1n a po.S.tion to h..,.. a trerf llleable 
ettaet on .Aaen.oan policT • 
Gerlt-.V fftla Ult$ �il 191'9 was a det'eatacl en.,- \1Dder ndli t_,. 
ocoupation. Luc:lue D. C1Q' was the llfteri can in comtnd of that 
occupation, 8DC\ be was t1.ml.7 oomitted to l.ul B\lmB!!• Ba a6li te 
tha\• althoqh his otf'ieial polic1 ••• n•wal• •it vae our ._ • • • to 
point out tu ae.dt.• of t.Ne entus>riae • .211 
It one rev.I._.. Atler.1.o. actions in the 0-.tn. poli tioal area, 
one oen easU1 detect tbe AIMri.OM e.imdtm.t to tne enterprise. TM 
21.?!We, P• lh6. 
218Jobn �. 0Cold Wal't Gena• :r.ont, " Tb# �  
••tens. II (Spring, 1971). Sl. 
21'1.Hlaa Chf 1 hJd:l!!n J:! � P• 2'l• 
8l 
period fro• HQ' of 194$ antil. Septeltber ot Ub,6 NW American policy 
shitt tl'01n one ot punittv• ren et.tons to one of rebu1lding th• .tonaw 
__,,. , . economy on the 1>4tsia or free enterprtee, in line Vith American 
political and eoonomic philoeopht. 'l'h• SPD• a d9aads tor soe141aation 
and a centraliud � did not meet the object vea ot Ammean 
post-var .tomcn polley in a rapidly polarising world. 
The Clriais over the SID is an example of t.be Uatted States • 
interest in prevenUng the So'1'1et Union t:rom con'brolling a fused 
Social at-oonaunist party in V•tem Germanf • In this inateoe, tb• 
danger to .&Hric• objeotivea in Ge� app&eecl to be sre•• if tbe 
Sov.l.et 'backe4 SID ,....  aUe1*1 to dominate the 1-aclereb1p ot the •ridnc 
cl.au 1n the wutarn 110nu than it the SPD and. its milder tons ot 
aociali.111 maintained. wol'ktnc claaa lo,yal.t.y. As a result, tbe United 
Stai.a oppoaed the merger ot the SPD and tb4I XPD, and the SPD Nll&l.Md 
tbe pritur,y working ol.••• pan,, in the ,,..t;eni anea. 
During the period after D.Jma•' speech It Stuttgart, the SPD 
began 1lo pueh at.ronaJ.7 eocial.1.s•\ton ot indu...,. Ita leader, lurt 
Schumacher, was a oonatant tho:m in the side of the W.etern Allies, 
�I their ooeupat.ton polici.ea and point:lna out the neaeui\f tor 
soei.U. to be impl .. tec.t in �-· This p:reaaure by the SPI> vas 
met. with equal coun�H\11"9 on the pan ot th• Ameri�-.. a, u!Qg 
th• powra proVided. to it as an oocupa\ton toi-ce, the Uni te4 states ..,.. 
ab1e to aaooeeafuU, block SPll movu toward aoei.iiaaU.on ot indu•trT • 
Thi a  can be ,... 1n the ._.ican po�" er aoc1al.iaation meaaure• 
appnved by the Gfmla8 and in th• American Ol'gani.Zation of bimonal 
ageoies ad oouncUs to recmce SPD in.f'luenoe, to cite only tw �··· 
• 
The debates during the period. 1n which the Buie Law vae being 
drafted an ful'ther •tconi• between the United ltltff ad the SPD 
over the iaaue of tederaliam versus centralisation. Th• Allia:r.:toans 
appli.C pressure tbroughoat the diaeueaions to COD'lince the Germana 
ot the need tor • feder.U, at.ructured Germe ft.Public. The SPD, whose 
atrengtJi in the Parliuan\art Counoil was eqael. to ibat ot the coo . na 
able to produee dratts of the Baio Law whioh were not met with Anteri..ean 
approval. However, the United States ncoeedM.. by tb:tea�r '° 
re'\um the whol.e queaUon of • ncnt Oenl• .Wte back 1lo the l'weip 
Mim.stezra• Confer-..., 1n. getUng a la itJ ta which eontain«l 1a0re 
f edel'al features than the SPD deeind. 
Th• at\ittldea and decisions of General Clq are ind.ieatd.ve ot 
American reaction to the time ot the SPJ>. Hie actions throughout the 
ocoupatd.on period, fro• bis nfUNl to alloW the Le Be1ee to impleMl'l\ 
th• socialiaation measun1 of 1 ts con.at1 tutd.on to his deltt.Y in tran811ti tt.!ng 
the co:ncU:tatory let.tel' from the Allied Foftd.gn Minlstere to the 
Perliamentey Council \lft"U after it could have no poli tit.cal benefit tor 
the SPD, reveal. bow �t.Nl· .Merica poliq waa 1n rulity. As the 
Cold War piog:re&ud1 and eoci&liam was being flqtlated with commu.ni• in 
the minda of ao manr paopl•, the IPD must ha,,. appeared even more dubiou 
with re.spec\ to American economic and political interests. Olay vu 1n 
the p0ai'tion to effectivel.T illpoae his economic and pclitic4 oonoeptiona 
on West Gelmtm.11 and this he finll1 attempted to do. Perhaps it ia 
unrealistic to expect him to have acted othend.ee. 
!broughout the pel'iod of \he occupation, the United Statee 
proclaimed a pollor ot neuV.U '1 towud Genta poll t.:l.cal parties, and. 
it muat be admitted that this writer baa found no evidance to indicate 
that OMJUS interfered in the electoral. process to prevent the German 
people from Hl.ect1ng 1rh• par\;1 ot t;heir choice, be it the SPD o:r 
otlMnd.se. Honv.r, the United States did do what conquering nations 
have dona since the t.im• ot Caesar, and that is to attempt to impose ita 
own systems upon the nation it has conquered, and to use that nat.ton as 
a component in the foreign policy o:t the v:lctorioua power. Amerl.can. 
ofticial.e believed that .federalism and spee1fieally the tree enterprise 
qetem o.'f'.t'ered the best hop• tor 0.rmarJT ' s  future, u wll a s W.atem. 
&.U'op• ' •• and above all, the containing of Scrvi.t Comtmmiam. Du• in 
large part to Aaerican etfo:rts, a political.l.71 eoonomically', aid aocial.1.7 
stable West Gernu1r17 did provide a strong bulwadc against Russian presau" 
which stood tor l!IOOialisa and eentnUAt4.on1. coUl.d be apected to be 
oppoaed b:f Amerl.can occupti:ii.on authori\1. ..  who believed in distinctJ.t 
ditterent • o c.i,aI. and economic valuaa. 1bis was the can in Gem8DJ 
from 194$ until 191&9. 
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MIETIMGS or fHI MILIT.AltY OOVEMORS AND MIHIS't.BIS.PRISIDIJIT OF 
Tim wsstmm ZONIS OB 1U!U  GlRUI POLITICAL OIOAWIZATIOI 
OOCUMllfT I 
l July l9b.8 
MGNP/P{48)l 
SUBJSCT1 Const! t.uent Asst111bl.;r 
nr• Hi� tal'.1 Oovemora of the US,. UK and hench ZOnea of Occupa­
tion in a....,,,. in aco rdance with the deoie!one ot their recapect1• 
0oV8l'l11Dellts, authorise the Mtniartea-Preaidm\ ot the states of their r.. 
apective aonee to convene • oonatltue\ � to 'be held not latv than 
l ,  Sept.her 19b8. Th• del4tgates to this ••--11 ldll be chosen in ooh 
� 
ot the exintng state. un4-' such pl'OCedu:re and. repl.ationa as &ball be 
4Kloptecl by the 1egiala1d.ve 'bodl' ot each of t.heN atatee. The total number 
ot delegates to the conatituct. a� w1ll be -� bJ di'V'iding 
the totll. pop\lla\iona at the la•• oenaue by vso.oo  or acme simile figure 
as uy be reoo•en4ed b)' tJie Hirdaten-Pruidet n.4 approYed by the 
M1l1 t07 Oovarnor•. !be ntaber ot delegates fl'o11 each stat.I will be in 
the ... proportion to the total. �P of tbe conatttu.ent uaemblJ' 
that 1ta population is to the toUl populatton 0£ 1ibe participating stat.a. 
The conat.ituent •••enabl.7 will draft a delloontic constitution whioh 
w11  establiah tor the partioipati.ng states a �tal structure 0£ 
federal type vhich 1• best adapted to the ewritual re-establishment of 
German uni '7 at present disrupted, and which protect the rights of the 
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participating statea# prov.ide ad.equate authority 1 and contain guararrteea 
of indiVidual rights and freedoms. 
It the conaU tut.ion as prepared by the consti tu ant assembly does 
not cont'lict With th••• general principle,, the Military Governors will 
'thoriae the aubmistld.on for ratifi.cati.on. The const.i tuent usemb)¥ 
wil.l thereupon be dissolved. The rat.i.f'icat.i.on Will take place by each 
participating state by meas of a referendum requirina a simple majoritf' 
0£ the voters in uch state under l\leh rulu and procedure as it mq 
adopt. When the constitution has been ratitied by two-thirds ot the 
etatea, it lfill CCJll8 into force and be binding upon all atatea. There­
atter, any amendment to the constitut:lon must be ratified by a like 
majority of t.be stat.a. W1 thin thirty days follow.f.,ng tho coming into 
.toroe of the oonstituti.on, the institutiona for whieh it provides shall 
be eetablisbe4. 
APPENDIX B 
BASIC �R THE FEDIRAL REPUBLIC OF GiRMANY 
PRE.AMIIJjj 
Conacioue of it.a HepOnaibility before God am before man, inspired. 
b7 the reeolw t.> preaet'ft ita national earl poli:M.Nl md. \y and ti.> serve 
world peace as an equal partner in a united Bvope, the German people 
in the l.aend.er ladm, Bavaria, Bnna , � a ..... Lover 
S8XOft7, Nort.h-llb.ine-We•tpbalia, Bbinal.Cld.-Pal.atinate, SChl.eswig. 
Holstein, Waerttembera•lad.ttn and W\tert�msollem 
baa, by virtue of it• oonetituen\ povel:', enaow this Basie Law ot the 
Federal Republic of Oentan1 to give a new order to political lite tor a 
trmai tional period. 
It baa 81• acted on behalf of thou Gemma to who• participation 
was denied. 
'l'be entire GeNan people 1• ulled 'IPQB to achieve, by free sel.f­
determination, tb.e �tr and freedom ot GttNany. 
